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IN MEMORY OF

MAJOR WILLOUGHBY MONTAGU,

Of the Royal Artillery, and Knight of the Russian Order of St. Wladimir, who died on the 2nd of February, 1873, aged 81 years. He received the above distinction from the Emperor of Russia for his services (with the Allied troops) at the siege of Dantzic. He was afterwards at Waterloo, at the capture of Cambray, and at the entry into Paris, where he was stationed at the Pont de Neuilly, sharing with the other officers, on arriving there, the luxurious rooms in the Palace or Château de Neuilly, from which Murat had fled but a few hours previously. Here also Captain Montagu made the acquaintance of some of the French nobility, and often spoke of his agreeable visits to the family of the Marquis de Montaigu. He remained with the Army of Occupation till the close of 1818; his guns being the very last, with the rear-guard from Boulogne, to leave the shores of France. Subsequently he served as Adjutant, and in 1844 was appointed, by Sir Henry Hardinge, Staff-Officer of Pensioners, and organised the Ipswich and Taunton districts. He was given the brevet of Major in 1846, with five years' back date, and was the last survivor of the sons of Montagu Montagu, Esq., of Little Bookham, Surrey, by Anne Catherine, daughter of the Hon. Henry Hobart, M.P., of Intwood Hall, Norfolk, youngest son of the first Earl of Buckinghamshire, whose father, Sir Henry Hobart, Bart., of Blickling, attended King William as Equerry at the battle of the Boyne in 1690.

Major W. Montagu married Catherine Magdalen, daughter of Alexander Mangin, Esq., of Dublin, but leaves no family. By his relations and friends he will ever be remembered with affectionate regard.

2318



MILITARY MAXIMS,

ILLUSTRATED BY

EXAMPLES.

BY

COL^L. JAMES CALLANDER.

War is ſo vaſt an Art, that the Man who is Maſter of it, muſt not only underſtand all other Sciences, but muſt likewiſe poſſeſs Courage, Mercy, Temperance, Vigilance, and a real Love for his Country.

Dulce et decorum eſt, pro Patriæ mori!

LONDON:

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TO

THE KING.

SIRE,

MY preſumption, in venturing to lay this work at Your Majeſty's feet, can only be equalled by my devotion, and zeal, for your ſervice.—It is a feeble attempt, to aſſiſt in the diſcipline of the inferior ranks of your armies, wholly unworthy of your notice, if Your Majeſty's extenſive knowledge, and unremitting attention, had not brought that diſcipline to the higheſt perfection.

I am,

SIRE,

Your MAJESTY'S

Moſt faithful Subject,

And moſt devoted Servant,

James Callander.

PREFACE,

Addreſſed to the OFFICERS of the ARMY.

AN ardent deſire to become of ſome uſe to thoſe who have embraced the moſt honourable of all profeſſions, is my ſole motive for preſenting you with this work. The young officer will find in theſe Maxims the road to the knowledge of his profeſſion, and of courſe his own advancement and honour. The veteran perhaps may aſſiſt his memory.

Many are the books that treat of the vaſt ſcience of war, in all its branches; but few, or none, confine themſelves to the conduct of the inferior officer with a ſmall command.—It would appear, military authors only wrote for the inſtruction of thoſe who command armies:—how few

riſe

ſiſe to that ſphere!——Yet may not the breaſt of the inferior officer glow with equal ardour for his country's glory and his own fame.

It is much to be lamented, that military writers and hiſtorians, are in general ſilent with regard to the actions of thoſe, who ſerve in an inferior ſtation; yet it is a fact, that as much true military genius, and undaunted courage, may be diſplayed in the defence of a poſt, containing fifty men, as in a field of battle containing fifty thouſand. Nor will it be denied, that ſometimes ſtates, oftimes armies, have owed their ſalvation, and exiſtence, to the conduct and gallantry of an individual, at the head of a ſmall detachment. Officers cannot load themſelves with many books. I have therefore endeavoured to comprize, in the leaſt compaſs poſſible, the whole ſyſtem of a ſmall detachment, elucidated by facts; thus, even in a didactical work,

work, entertainment will be blended with inſtruction.

Some French authors have treated the ſubject of detachment; but upon too large a ſcale, or, with the partiality that the French are notorious for, have ſupported theory with examples of conduct and valour only drawn from the actions of their countrymen. It is well known that brilliant actions of ſkill and courage, have been achieved by officers in almoſt every corps of the Britiſh army; but for want of being publiſhed, have moſt unfortunately ſunk into oblivion: ſuch as I could acquire authenticated, I have lent my poor endeavour to reſcue from that fate.

To ſelect examples, analogous to a ſmall detachment, is not an eaſy taſk; for military tranſactions, detailed by thoſe, who were not profeſſional men, ever appear nugatory, with regard to precept. A very ſhort time ſuffices, to gain a competent knowledge of the buſineſs, upon

the

the parade; but how different is the knowledge required for the defence of a poſt; the young officer receives and marches off his detachment, takes poſt, and is obliged to ſuſtain an attack, without knowing how to take a ſingle precaution to ſave his own honour or his ſoldiers lives.

Theſe Maxims are intended to prevent ſo unfortunate, ſo melancholy a cataſtrophe; and the reflection, that I may thus, in ſome meaſure, contribute to ſave a ſingle officer from a ſingle miſtake, conveys more ſatisfaction to my breaſt than I can expreſs. May I be permitted to plead, in excuſe for the incorrectneſs of ſtyle, that I have been bred to arms, from my earlieſt youth; and to hope it will paſs uncenſured, when the reader is pleaſed to recollect, *Le ſtyle d'un ſoldat ſent par fois la meche.*

Craigforth, April 1782.

MILITARY

MILITARY MAXIMS.

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VICTORY is ſeldom the effect of fortune, a judicious diſpoſition, will not onlv influence, but ſecure the ſucceſs of military operations.

To learn any ſcience, recourſe muſt be had to its elements; and the ſtudy of war, is to be commenced with its minutiæ.

The events of war, are ſo various, that there are moments, when even a ſubaltern

with a few men, may eſtabliſh a brilliant and aſting reputation.

Practice alone, will not make a complete officer, theory muſt aſſiſt.

A great general, has named three eſſentials, abſolutely required in the man, who means to become a ſoldier; courage, a quick eye, and good health.

A competent knowledge of field fortification, is abſolutely neceſſary: no excuſe can ſuffice for the want of it. It may be acquired in the ſhort period of a month.

Horſemanſhip is of ſo much advantage to an officer, that two hundred men can be conducted with more facility by being on horſeback,

horſeback, than fifty men can, when on foot.

No ſcience whatever, affords greater ſcope for the aſſiſtance of theory, than war.

Every moment of our lives will not ſuffice to ſtudy the vaſt ſcience of war, but every moment of the military man's life ſhould be devoted to the moſt honourable of all profeſſions.

We know how to act, by knowing how others in like ſituations, have acted before us.

Marchal Saxe, has expreſly ſaid, that he has known many armies entirely ruined,

from the negligence of the inferior officers, who commanded detachments, and ſmall out poſts.

The obſtinate defence of a detached poſt, is the theatre upon which a ſingle officer can gain the greateſt glory.

Diligence, expedition, prudence, and circumſpection, muſt ever be the attendants of an officer upon detachment.

If an officer is ſo fortunate, as to poſſeſs a diſpoſition for drawing, he ſhould ever cultivate that talent.

Leave nothing for chance to do, but what wiſdom cannot effect.

The

The leaſt relaxation in duty upon guard, may have very unhappy conſequences, even to the army at large.

Opportunity in war, is often of as much uſe as courage.

If a poſt is ordered to be defended to the laſt, no reaſon whatever, ſhould induce an officer to give it up.

Valour is ſuperior to numbers.

In general actions, victory is often the

effect of chance, not ſo in a ſmall detachment.

The profeſſion of war is a moſt critical one, inſtants are deciſive.

It is impoſſible to ſay, how good a defence may be made by a determined officer, who knows his buſineſs in a common farm houſe; the reſources of a man of genius in his profeſſion, are innumerable.

When an officer receives a detachment upon the Parade, he cannot inſpect them with too much care: he is to obſerve, that there are none of the detachment ſick, lame, or drunk: that each man is provided with a loaf, canteen, two flints, ſixty rounds, and firelock in good order.

Every

Every officer ſhould poſſeſs a good ſword, a watch, mathematical inſtruments, teleſcope, cord of twelve fathom divided by knots, pens, paper, and ink.

When you march a detachment, do your utmoſt to procure a good guide; if the guide is a ſtranger, tie him to a non-commiſſioned officer or old ſoldier.

Never permit any one to paſs your detachment upon the road.

Never enter a village, wood, or any kind of incloſed ground, without ſending a party to reconnoitre.

The ſoldiers of advanced guards, muſt neither light fires or ſmoke.

Never permit any one to approach your poſt, under any pretence whatever.

If a man deſerts, change the parole.

Poſts are generally attacked in the night, or juſt before day-break.

Silence under arms is the ſoul of diſcipline.

Never

Never fortify a circumference beyond your means of defence.

Calculate exactly the time it will require to march from one poſt to another.

You muſt carefully reconnoitre all the roads round your poſt.

When you take priſoners near your poſt, examine ſeparately, ſtrictly, and ſeverely; nor is it amiſs to pretend you mean to put them to death; you will thus be more likely to get at the truth.

Sometimes thoſe who pretend to be deſerters, and thoſe who bring things to ſell, are officers in diſguiſe; examine their hands and linen.

When poſted in a village, always keep ſome of the principal inhabitants with you; the danger they would incur in caſe of an attack, will prevent them ſending intelligence to the enemy.

Forbid the people of the village you are poſted in, to hold any intelligence or communication with the enemy under pain of death, during your ſtay.

Be very cautious how you receive intelligence from peaſants; beſides their ignorance, they may be ſent to deceive you.

If

If a peaſant comes into your poſt, ſhow him to others; learn from them whether they know him or not, and make him declare his buſineſs.

Endeavour, by rewards, to ſend a peaſant into the enemy's poſts for intelligence, or a woman; but, to ſecure their fidelity, ſeize the reſt of their family, and inform them, that if they betray you, you will put them to death.

If poſted in a church, houſe, or redoubt, have many veſſels filled with water, for thoſe employed in the defence, as well as the wounded, will want to drink frequently.

It is neceſſary to give your men a rendezvous in the rear of your poſt, at ſome diſtance, in caſe you ſhould be drove from it, where they may form again.

Always endeavour to attack your enemy in flank or rear.

To make your men alert, give them a falſe alarm, but let them remain ignorant of its being a falſe one, at any rate do it ſeldom.

Make your detachment appear as numerous as poſſible when you take poſt.

When

When poſted in a houſe or redoubt, collect from the next village all the ſcythes and pitchforks you can; you will find them of admirable uſe when the enemy endeavours to ſtorm the poſt.

If the attack you ſuſtain is long and obſtinate, and you find your men begin to flag, pretend to have received intelligence of ſuccours; this will raiſe their ſpirits, and enable you to continue the defence.

Remove your wounded from the ſight of thoſe who are fighting; their cries and groans have ſome effect, even upon the braveſt ſoldiers.

Beware

Beware of a ſurpriſe during a ſtormy day, a thick fog, or a fall of ſnow; it is often attempted during thoſe periods.

When you ~~command~~ a poſt that muſt be defended to extremity, collect the opinion of the officers with you, how it can be beſt done; but, however untenable, let not a word eſcape that may imply a doubt, whether it can be defended or not.

To prevent deſertion at night, the centries and videttes muſt be doubled, and men, ſtrangers to each other, poſted together; if they perceive the enemy, one of them muſt return with ſpeed, and inform his officer, the other remains as long as poſſible, to diſcover their numbers.

When

When a centry diſcovers the enemy between him and his guard, he muſt directly fire his piece.

If a detachment halts in a village but for a moment, it is the officer's duty to examine how it can be beſt defended in caſe of an attack.

No precaution in war can be deemed ſuperfluous.

If your men are fatigued, and it becomes abſolutely neceſſary to halt for refreſhment, ſtop at ſome diſtance from the village, and ſend a non-commiſſioned officer, with a file of men, for what you want, during their

their abſence your detachment muſt ſtand to their arms.

When a deſerter comes into your poſt, ſend him directly to head quarters.

In the day time, if poſted in a village, place a centry upon the ſteeple; if in the country, upon the higheſt tree near your poſt.

No diſtance from the enemy ſhould induce an officer to pull off his cloaths or accoutrements when upon guard.

An officer who does his duty, will often, during the night, viſit his centries.

An

An officer ſhould never ſuffer himſelf to think, that the little time a detachment is to remain in a poſt ſhould be a reaſon to neglect preparations for the defence.

When poſted in a village, call the roll frequently to prevent deſertion.

In ſevere weather relieve the centinels every hour or half hour.

In froſt, order the centinels, during the night, to lay their ear to the ground, from time to time; they will hear the approach of men or horſes at a great diſtance.

The

The defence of a poſt muſt be regulated by the means of attack.

Any detachment of cavalry poſted near the enemy muſt be mounted all night.

However ſmall or numerous a detachment may be, about a third ſhould form a reſerve. Upon all occaſions this will be found uſeful, to ſuccour any particular part of the attack, to charge the enemy in flank, to purſue when victorious, to form an ambuſcade, and to ſecure a retreat.

If poſted in a plain open country, your centinels form a circle round the poſt, and during the night, keep moving towards each other.

One

One half of an out-poſt of infantry muſt ſtand to their arms during the night, the other half, though they lie down, muſt keep their arms in their hands.

All centinels muſt be poſted, ſo as to be ſeen by the guard, if the country is open; if the country is incloſed, they muſt be poſted within hearing of the guard and of each other.

Never neglect any intelligence, let it be conveyed by whom it will.

It is impoſſible to be too vigilant upon guard; but an hour before day-break all guards muſt ſtand to their arms.

Wherever you are poſted, ſecure your flanks by art, if they are not ſo by nature.

An officer that is ſurpriſed is diſhonoured.

When a party is ſent to reconnoitre, the officer who leads it has often an opportunity to diſtinguiſh himſelf, by ſurpriſing a poſt of the enemy: A ſmall party upon thoſe occaſions may inſult a large one; night is the moſt favourable period.

In military operations there are no ſmall faults.

An officer cannot wiſh for a better opportunity to diſtinguiſh himſelf, than when ſent to gain intelligence, or reconnoitre a fort, poſt, or body of troops. To do it properly he muſt poſſeſs courage, coolneſs, addreſs, and the military coup d'oeil.

If by a bold and judicious ſtroke you can ſurpriſe a poſt, and either deſtroy or take them priſoners, retire directly, but not by the ſame route you came.

A ſurpriſe is generally attended with conſternation in thoſe attacked, and preſumption in thoſe who attack.

You never can reflect too much upon an enterprise, or execute with too much boldneſs.

The coup d'oeil militaire, may be defined, a glance of the eye, that upon all occaſions ſees inſtantly and certainly the objects before it.

An officer ſhould frequently viſit the outpoſts of the army; it helps to form the coup d'oeil.

That officer approaches neareſt to perfection in his profeſſion, who can form a true judgment of his own and the enemy's force.

A diligent

A diligent officer will provide himſelf with every map or chart of the country in which he ſerves: A perfect knowledge of a country is not to be gained without it.

War does not give to courage alone the victory.

The coup d'oeil is not entirely a gift of nature, it can be much improved, it can even be acquired: The ſports of the field, either on horſeback or on foot, aſſiſts to give an idea of diſtances, the level of grounds, and the nature of their ſurface. An officer who loves his profeſſion, will make even his amuſements contribute to his knowledge. On a journey, likewiſe, the face of the country will give inſtruction, by forming ideal plans of defence and attack; this will ſoon teach the eye to meaſure diſtances with accuracy.

It is ſometimes the caſe, that picked men are to compoſe your party; always chuſe old ſoldiers, they handle their arms better, are more attentive, and not ſo eaſily alarmed at the appearance of danger, as young ones.

It is the buſineſs of an officer, to make an affair appear eaſy to the men; for the moment it begins, they always endeavour to learn from his countenance their own ſituation; therefore whatever iſſue the officer thinks it may have, he ſhould encourage the men by words, and ſay, that with courage on their parts, added to the goodneſs of his diſpoſition, he thinks the victory certain.

Never extend your line of defence, beyond the means you have to defend it.

Poſt

Poſt your centinels if poſſible, ſo, that they may ſee, without being ſeen.

Never give leave, to any of your men, to ſkirmiſh; it is a common ſtratagem to draw on a ſkirmiſh, and by that means carry off the poſt.

A poſt is often to be defended to the laſt extremity; the enemy finding your defence obſtinate, will feign a retreat, to draw you from your poſt; permit only your reſerve to purſue them, and that with caution.

Never deſpiſe your enemy, although it is well your ſoldiers hold them in contempt.

Never take poſt near a wood, a vigilant enemy will carry you off.

As the men who compoſe your party, may be ſtrangers to you, the moment you receive them upon the general parade, tell them off yourſelf ſeveral times very diſtinctly; then make them go through the priming and loading motions, and the ſeveral wheelings; it will make them acquainted with your voice, and you will diſcover by this means, the proper men to put upon the flanks.

Beſides the parole of the day, give your centinels a private ſignal, to know your rounds by in the night; too many cautions cannot be made uſe of to prevent a ſurprize.

During the night, ſend out frequently patroles towards the enemy.

Valour and knowledge, oftentimes ſupply the want of numbers.

When poſted at a great diſtance from the army, and you perceive a large body of the enemy advancing to attack you, retreat in time, before you can be cut off.

Always make your retreat, by as ſtrong ground as you can, and from time to time ſtop the purſuit, by forming falſe ambuſcades in the following manner—ſend before you on the road you mean to retire by, a few file of your moſt active men; make them occupy the firſt village, lane, hedge, copſe or wood; they muſt ſeem endeavouring to

conceal themſelves, by running backwards and forwards, ſometimes diſappearing entirely, and then ſhowing themſelves here and there: the enemy will naturally ſtop to reconnoitre; before that can be done, you may have occupied ſome ſtrong poſt, or got a great way before them; when theſe men that form the falſe ambuſcade, have amuſed the enemy as long as they can with ſafety, they muſt diſperſe, and rejoin you with all ſpeed.

Never permit your whole guard to fire at once, keep at leaſt a third loaded, tell them off accordingly; a ſmart fire by files, is the moſt effectual for the defence of a poſt.

If a man lies down, or offers to run away, you muſt without heſitation, put him to death.

Soldiers ſhould be more afraid of their own officers than the enemy.

An

An officer who underſtands his buſineſs, and has the coup d'oeil, will not find it difficult to out-flank a large party, with a ſmall one.

Small detachments in general, ſhould be drawn up two deep, and told off accordingly, in two diviſions.

Examine the arms of every relief, to ſee that their pieces are primed, flints faſt, hammer-ſtalls off, and all in good order.

Before you paſs a plain, examine carefully whether there is any appearance of the enemy, and prepare accordingly; if your detachment is compoſed of infantry, manage your fire ſo as to repulſe them, untill you gain a ſtrong poſt, where you can make a ſtand; if cavalry, charge without heſitation whatever preſents itſelf; the only

means of ſafety for ſoldiers, is by ſhewing a brave countenance.

If the country is incloſed, keep your rear open if poſſible, flanking parties conſtantly out, and ſend intelligent men to the different heights, in your line of march to reconnoitre.

There are many ſituations, where you may order your centinels to lie flat upon the ground.

When a poſt is completely inveſted by a ſuperior force, that you are without hope of ſuccour, or further means of defence; propoſe to capitulate before your ammunition is entirely expended; that the terms you get, may be ſuch, as becomes a man of honour to accept; if they are otherwiſe;

otherwiſe, let the conſequence be what it will, reject them with diſdain.

If your poſt is ſurrounded, prolong the defence until it is dark, the night will preſent ſome favourable moment, to break through the enemy and ſave the men.

An officer who eſcorts a line of baggage, is not under any pretence whatever to divide his eſcort into ſmall parties.

If the baggage you have the care of, conſiſts of waggons, inform thoſe who drive them, that upon the appearance of the enemy, if any of them preſume to unyoke their horſes, you will directly put them to death.

If a line of baggage is attacked by ſo ſtrong a force, that you cannot repulſe, and continue the march at the ſame time; draw up the waggons either in a ſquare or circle, as the ground will admit, put the horſes and drivers in the center; take off two wheels on the ſame ſide of each waggon, this will form an excellent barricade, make a vigorous defence, and ſend to the neareſt poſt for aſſiſtance.

Send your patroles by different roads, and at uncertain hours.

Patroles are never to ſpeak, ſing, or ſmoke, are to ſtop frequently to liſten; and often, particularly in froſt, to apply their the ground.

Patroles

Patroles ſhould never conſiſt of above three or four men.

If a patrole diſcovers the enemy, they muſt retire on one ſide, halt, and preſerve ſtrict ſilence; let the enemy paſs, count their numbers, and return with ſpeed, but without noiſe, to their officer.

If an outguard from being poſted in a village, is to retire acroſs a plain of any extent, be aſſured you will be obliged to ſuſtain an attack of light troops; take from the village ſome empty waggons, to ſecure your flanks, when attacked; fifty men, with their flanks ſecure, may continue their march in ſafety, though ſurrounded by ſeveral ſquadrons of light troops.

When a party is poſted in ambuſcade, whoever falls in with it, muſt be taken into cuſtody; call the roll frequently, if a man deſerts, retire directly; the horſes always bridled, the infantry with their arms in their hands, the whole profoundly ſilent; no fires to be made, no counterſign to be given out; and when your ambuſcade covers the center of the enemy you mean to ſurprize, you are to ſally out, attack with the greateſt impetuoſity, and a warlike ſhout.

An officer who is detached with a party, either to ſurprize a poſt of the enemy, or to gain intelligence, ſhould be thoroughly acquainted with the country, but if deficient in that reſpect, he muſt preſs good guides, and be careful they do not eſcape; the beſt mode to prevent their eſcape, is to tie them to old ſoldiers, who you will inform them, will put them to immediate death, if they offer to run away, or, if they lead the detachment aſtray.

When

When a party is retreating before the enemy, ſome of the braveſt and moſt active men, muſt be diſperſed in the rear, to ſkirmiſh, and thereby facilitate the retreat of the whole.

The ſafety of infantry, when purſued by cavalry, conſiſts in the cloſeneſs of their order.

If a ſmall body of infantry is cloſely purſued by a large body of infantry, and the country incloſed, as their laſt reſource, they may diſperſe.

When you occupy a poſt that muſt be defended, raiſe the ſpirits of your men, by bold and reſolute expreſſions.

Never take poſt upon a ſpot commanded by a height.

However cold it may be, avoid if poſſible, having fires made in your poſt during the night: if the country is open, it is highly dangerous.

Never permit your men to leave their poſt, or a ſtranger to come into it.

At duſk, bring your centinels nearer your poſt than in the day time, and ſend out your patroles.

When you diſcover any movement of conſequence

conſequence in the enemy's camp, or any large body of troops in motion, ſend directly a report of it to head quarters; you are to ſign the report, and mention the hour you ſend it off, but take care, as you value your honour, not to give a falſe alarm.

The ſecurity of an army, depends upon the vigilance of the out-poſts.

When a poſt is fortifying, two-thirds of the whole, muſt remain under arms.

Centinels poſted in a wood, are not to walk about.

When a detachment of infantry marches over open ground, where they may be charged by cavalry, form them three deep; if

if about thirty men, in two diviſions; if about fifty, in three; if about one hundred, in four; continue your march in column, a diviſion in front, have a few of your beſt men ſcattered upon your flanks and front, in proportion to your ſtrength, at the diſtance of fifteen paces from your detachment, to keep up a teizing fire: if the cavalry has reſolution to charge you, halt, and form a front every way; fire briſkly by ranks, the rear rank begins at the diſtance of three hundred paces, taking aim at the horſes heads, firing by files is equally good; laſtly, receive them with fixed bayonets, the men kneeling, and the but of the firelock upon the ground; this will preſent a chevaux de frize that cannot be forced; the men in the center of your detachment are not to kneel, but continue their fire over the heads of thoſe who are kneeling, and this may be done with ſafety, as by the above diſpoſition, according to your numbers, your men will be formed, either ſix, nine, or twelve deep, without leſſening their fire.

If a ſoldier ſhould forget himſelf ſo far as to mutiny, when on an out poſt, and near

near the enemy, there is but one way to ſtop it; ſhoot, without heſitation, the mutineer.

If you are poſted in a village, upon no account permit the inhabitants to hold fairs, markets, make proceſſions, or aſſemble together.

When a large body of deſerters approaches your poſt, order them to lay down their arms in a heap, and ſend a file of men to conduct them to the neareſt grand guard, who will ſend them to head-quarters.

If the weather is ſo intenſely cold, that you muſt of neceſſity have a fire during the night, order likewiſe ſeveral fires to be lighted upon the ſame line with your poſt; this will deceive the enemy with regard to your ſituation, and prevent a ſurprize.

When a man deſerts, change the parole and counter-ſign, as the deſerter will give the former to the enemy, and they will endeavour to ſurpriſe you.

The officers of a detachment muſt conſult together, before they make any movement of moment, but always out of the hearing of the ſoldiers, and ſhould they differ in opinion, it muſt not appear to the men; the movement once reſolved upon, the inferior officers, whatever they may think, are to obey with courage and alacrity.

An officer ſhould encourage his men to work briſkly, by ſometimes taking the pick-ax in his own hand, and the moment the attack begins, ſhew the moſt determined reſolution both by words and actions.

A few

A few cavalry may cut their way through any number, provided they do it without hesitation, or what the French call tête baissé.

A commanding officer is never, upon any account, to leave his post to hold a conference with the enemy.

No distance from the enemy can secure a post from being carried off; depend alone upon vigilance.

When you march in an open country, provide each man with a stake four feet long, sharp at both ends; if cavalry approach

proach to charge you, plant the ſtakes ſloping outwards to receive them.

When you have time to break up the roads that lead from the enemy to your poſt, always do it.

An officer upon ſervice, that indulges a diſpoſition for wine, women, or play, will neither gain reputation or honour.

Nothing animates ſoldiers ſo much as the conſtant preſence of the officers, upon all duties, whether of fatigue or danger.

In conducting either the defence or attack of a poſt, it is better to take many uſele

uſeleſs precautions, than to be wanting in one neceſſary one.

Never ſuppoſe any part of your poſt ſo ſtrong naturally, that it will not require likewiſe art and men for its guard.

When a detachment is drove from their poſt, and the road lies through a village, the paſſage on either ſide being impeded by canals, hedges, woods, or moraſs; ſet fire to the village if the purſuit is vigorous, it will put a total ſtop to the purſuers for ſome time.

If waggons are driving to your poſt loaded with hay or ſtraw, ſuffer them not to approach, until you have run ſwords through them; as men may be concealed in them.

Before

Before you enter a village, ſend for the curate, or the principal inhabitant, and make him declare, whether there are any of the enemy in the village, or when he laſt ſaw or heard of them.

Never permit a woman to enter your poſt, they are employed oftener than men to diſcover the ſituation and number of a guard.

Be as alert during the time you are upon guard, as if you conſtantly ſaw the enemy.

There are ſome ſigns in the movement of troops, which, by paying attention to, will enable you to judge of the operations of

of the enemy; for inſtance, if you ſee clouds of duſt in the enemy's camp, it is certain ſomething extraordinary is in agitation; though the appearance of duſt occaſioned by foraging parties is not the ſame as that of troops on their march. You may judge likewiſe which way the enemy directs his march, by the ſun ſhining upon the arms; if its rays are perpendicular, he approaches, if varied and unfrequent he retreats; if they dart from right to left, he moves to the left, if on the contrary from left to right, he is marching to the right.

It is impoſſible for an officer to queſtion the guide that is to lead his detachment too minutely; a ſmall gratification is well beſtowed upon a guide.

At night, light fires upon the angles of your poſt, or work, at the diſtance of ſixty paces; they will be of great uſe if an attack is made.

Rather

Rather, upon ſervice, ride an indifferent horſe you can manage, than a very good one you are not maſter of.

An officer is not to think every thing fair in war, as ſome captains of note have ſaid; and, without having recourſe to the *jus gentium*, common ſenſe and the laws of honour will dictate.

Give it in ſtrict charge to your centries, that they are neither to ſit down, quit their arms, ſing, ſmoke, or hold converſation with any one whatever.

A centry is never to ſuffer any man to come within reach of him.

A centry

A centry is to fire his piece if ſurrounded.

When an officer is ordered to attack a poſt, he ſhould endeavour to do it by ſtratagem, it will generally ſucceed.

If there is an alarm or ſkirmiſh within hearing of your poſt, always ſend an officer, or two good ſoldiers, to bring you intelligence, and make your men ſtand to their arms.

When an officer knows he is to be poſted at a diſtance from houſes, ſo that he cannot get entrenching tools of any kind, he muſt apply to the commanding officer upon the parade, for ſhovels, hatchets, and pick-

pick-axes, in proportion to the number of his party.

Learn all the intelligence you can from the officer you relieve.

In marching a detachment, the officer who commands ſhould never hurry the men; make them keep their files cloſe, and ſuffer none to remain behind, without a non-commiſſioned officer being left with them.

When an officer approaches the poſt he is to relieve, he ſhould march with as much precaution, as if he was certain the poſt was in the hands of the enemy; as indeed it ſometimes is the caſe.

All

All detached guards in marching to their poſt, muſt be preceded by a corporal and a few men, to reconnoitre the roads before the detachment.

Whenever a guard is attacked, the officer commanding muſt diſpatch directly a good ſoldier to inform the neareſt poſt, and for expedition mount him upon his own horſe.

It is already ſuppoſed that an officer has a knowledge of field fortification, and of courſe muſt know how much time it will take to fortify a houſe, or conſtruct a redoubt of given dimenſions.

In general, a circular redoubt is the beſt calculated for defence, and of eaſieſt conſtruction.

Nothing embarraſſes men more, when attacking a poſt, than an abbatis (felled trees) or holes irregularly made round the poſt, with a ſtake at bottom, called trous des loups.

It is a decided fact, that one hundred men, poſted and intrenched according to rule, will effect more than a thouſand who have taken up a wrong poſition.

One unanſwerable reaſon for fortifying a poſt is, that it will ſave the blood of the ſoldiers;

ſoldiers; this the officer never can be too ſparing of.

Order in the neareſt peaſants, with tools, to help to fortify your poſt, it will ſave the labour of your men; but uſe the peaſants with gentleneſs, and permit not your men to plunder them.

When a guard is poſted in a ſtone building, for inſtance, a church, old caſtle, gentleman's houſe, or large barn, and to remain there; in that caſe, ſuch building muſt be immediately fortified: but as their forms differ, only general rules upon that head can be given; turn out the inhabitants, if any houſe commands the poſt, pull it down; burn every thing combuſtible near it, ſuch as thatch, piles of wood, or furze; that they may not be made uſe of againſt you, ſurround the poſt with an abbatis, but principally at the angles, barricade the doors with beams, dung, or ſtones. Then break one row of loop holes, three feet aſunder, eight inches long, two inches wide within, and ſix

without, all round the building, at one foot from the ground, and dig a trench at two feet from the wall, to place the men in, who are to defend them. Break another race of loop holes, ſeven feet from the ground, above the intervals of thoſe below; and place the benches, chairs and tables, round the wall, to ſerve for a banquette for thoſe who are to defend them. Obtain as much croſs or flank fire as poſſible, by the aid of thoſe parts of the building that project. If the windows are ſo low, that the enemy can fire into them, or have not iron bars, barricade them as before directed: deſtroy the communication, from one ſtory to another, by breaking down the ſtaircaſe, and make uſe of ladders. Fix a tree in the ground, within the building, with the branches on; that ſhould the enemy force the door, they may not be able to ruſh in, in a body, but muſt then enter ſideways. Make loop holes in the upper part of the building, take off the roof, and pull down the wall to breaſt high, that the men may fire over it. Collect a quantity of large ſtones, that you may tumble them down upon thoſe who endeavour to undermine the building. Provide pitch-forks, to overturn the ladders the enemy will endeavour to ſcale the wall with, and tubs of water to extinguiſh fire. In caſe the enemy ſhould get into the ground floor, you are not to ſuppoſe from that,

that, that they are more likely to carry the poſt: make a great many holes in the floor, about four inches diameter, over the door, and other weak parts, that you may fire down upon them; pour likewiſe water through thoſe holes, it will wet their arms, prevent them from ſeeing, and cauſe great confuſion: have ſome trees with the branches on, to barricade the door afreſh, when you have drove them out. Sacks filled with earth, will be found uſeful to barricade different parts of the building. If you have men enough to defend likewiſe the outhouſes, the ſame mode muſt be followed; remember always the angles are the weakeſt parts, therefore greater attention muſt be had to their defence, and that a croſs or flank fire is the beſt.

An officer ſhould explain with great preciſion to the men, in what the ſtrength of the poſt conſiſts; ſhow them how it is to be defended, what is to be done in ſuch and ſuch a caſe; and make thoſe men who ſeem leaſt to comprehend, ſcramble over the abbatis, and ſcale the wall, to prove to them, that if they can with difficulty do it now, it would become certain deſtruction, if their fire was added to the defence.

When a party is large enough to occupy a village, (as their figures and ſituations differ, only general rules can be given for their defence) reconnoitre the ground carefully round the place, ſee whether the enemy can approach unperceived, or, whether the village is commanded by any height. Break loop holes in the houſes, at the extremities, ſo as they may flank each other, taking care they are not too far aſunder. Make a breaſt-work of waggons filled with dung or earth, and two wheels on one ſide taken off; or throw up a parapet, with a ditch, in the conſtruction of which, take every advantage the ground admits, to produce a flank fire. Surround the whole with an abbatis, or trous des loups, particularly about the houſes that flank the line of defence; clear the ground without your works, that the enemy may be quite expoſed to your fire in their approach. Fortify the church as a laſt recourſe, in caſe of misfortune; men ever fight with moſt ſpirit, when they know they have a place of retreat.

Let your ſoldiers know, that they are not

to

to ſuppoſe their fire will prevent a brave enemy from approaching the works to ſtorm the poſt; the defence moſt to be depended upon, is a briſk uſe of the bayonet; this cannot be told them too often.

When an officer finds his poſt no longer tenable, and that he muſt of neceſſity capitulate, he muſt aſk every thing there is the leaſt probability of being granted; but inſiſt upon the two following particulars, to march out with your arms, and to be conducted to the neareſt poſt, by the ſhorteſt road.

A conqueror is delighted to honour, conduct and courage in his adverſary; it adds luſtre to his glory.

The defence of a poſt, is an eaſy matter, when it is remarked, that to ſucceed in the

attack, the aſſailant muſt poſſeſs great courage, good ſenſe, a head for ſtratagem, a daring ſpirit, a ready execution, and a cautious foreſight: how ſeldom do theſe qualities meet!

The officer who diligently applies theſe maxims, will gain reputation, and acquit himſelf with honour.

EXAM-

EXAMPLES

TO ILLUSTRATE

THE FOREGOING MAXIMS.

THEN Cyrus having called together the generals and captains of the Greeks, adviſed with them concerning the order of battle, when he encouraged them by the following perſuaſions: "O Greeks! it is not from any want of Barbarians that I make uſe of you as my auxiliaries, "but becauſe I look upon you as ſuperior to "great numbers of them, for that reaſon I have "taken you alſo into my ſervice; ſhew yourſelves, therefore, worthy of that liberty which "you enjoy, in the poſſeſſion of which I think "you extremely happy; for, be aſſured, that I "would prefer liberty before all things I poſſeſs, with the addition of many others. But, "that you may underſtand what kind of combat "you are going to engage in, I ſhall explain it "to you: Their numbers are great, and they "come on with mighty ſhouts, which, if you

" can withſtand, for the reſt, I am almoſt " aſhamed to think what kind of men you will " find our country produces; but you are ſol- " diers, behave yourſelves with bravery, and, if " any one of you deſires to return home, I will " take care to ſend him back the envy of his " country; but I am confident that my beha- " viour will engage many of you rather to fol- " low my fortunes than return home."

CLEARCHUS then marched with his army in order of battle, to conclude the truce, he himſelf taking charge of the rear. In their march they met with ditches and canals full of water, which they were not able to paſs without bridges. Theſe they made with palm trees, ſome of which they found lying upon the ground, others they cut down. Upon this occaſion, it might be obſerved, how equal Clearchus was to the command; for, taking his pike in his left hand, and a ſtaff in his right, if he ſaw any of thoſe he had appointed to this ſervice backward in the execution of it, he diſplaced him, and ſubſtituted a proper perſon in his room; he himſelf, at the ſame time, going into the dirt and aſſiſting them, ſo that every one was aſhamed not to be active. He had appointed men of thirty years of age to this ſervice, but, when thoſe of a more advanced age ſaw Clearchus forwarding the work in perſon, they gave their aſſiſtance alſo. Clearchus preſſed it the more, becauſe he ſuſpected the ditches were not always ſo full of water, for it was not the ſeaſon to water the country; he therefore

imagined the king had ordered the waters to be let out with this view, that the Greeks might foreſee great difficulties attending their march.

THEN Xenophon roſe up, dreſſed for the war in the moſt gorgeous armour he could provide; for he thought, if the gods granted him victory, theſe ornaments would become a conqueror, and if he were to die, they would decorate his fall. He began in the following manner: "Cleanor has laid before you the perjury and "treachery of the Barbarians, which, to be ſure, "you yourſelves are no ſtrangers to: If, there-"fore, we have any thoughts of trying their "friendſhip again, we muſt be under great con-"cern, when we conſider what our generals "have ſuffered, who, by truſting to their faith, "put themſelves in their power; but if we pro-"poſe to take revenge of them with our ſwords "for what they have done, and perſecute them "for the future with war in every ſhape, we "have, with the aſſiſtance of the gods, many fair "proſpects of ſafety."

AFTER that they marched with all poſſible expedition. The enemy, who were upon the hill, the moment they ſaw them climb the mountain, advanced at the ſame time, ſtriving to get there before them. Upon this occaſion there

was a vaſt ſhout raiſed both by the Greek army and that of Tiſſaphernes, each encouraging their own men. And Xenophon, riding by the ſide of his troops, called out to them, "Soldiers, "think you are this minute contending to re- "turn to Greece, this minute to ſee your wives "and children; after this momentary labour we "ſhall go on without any farther oppoſition." To whom Soteridas ſaid, "We are not upon "equal terms, O Xenophon! for you are on "horſeback, while I am greatly fatigued with "carrying my ſhield." Xenophon hearing this, leaped from his horſe, and thruſt him out of his rank; then, taking his ſhield, marched on as faſt as he could. He happened to have a horſeman's corſlet on that time, which was very troubleſome; however, he called to thoſe that were before to mend their pace, and to thoſe behind, who followed with great difficulty, to come up. The reſt of the ſoldiers beat and abuſed Soteridas, and threw ſtones at him, till they obliged him to take his ſhield and go on. Then Xenophon remounted, and led them on horſeback as far as the way would allow; and, when it became impaſſable for his horſe, he haſtened forward on foot. At laſt they gained the top of the mountain, and prevented the enemy.

WHEN they came to their tents, the ſoldiers employed themſelves in getting proviſions, and the generals and captains aſſembled and were in great perplexity; for, on one ſide of them were exceeding

exceeding high mountains, and on the other a river ſo deep, that when they ſounded it with their pikes, the ends of them did not appear even above the water: While they were in this perplexity, a certain Rhodian came to them, and ſaid, "Gentlemen, I'll undertake to carry over "four thouſand heavy armed men at a time, if "you'll ſupply me with what I want, and give "me a talent for my pains." Being aſked what he wanted, "I ſhall want, ſays he, two thouſand "leather bags; I ſee here a great number of "ſheep, oxen, goats, and aſſes; if theſe are "fleaed, and their ſkins blown, we may eaſily "paſs the river with them. I ſhall alſo want "the girts belonging to the ſumpter horſes; "with theſe, adds he, I will faſten the bags to "one another, and hanging ſtones to them, let "them down into the water, inſtead of anchors, "then tie up the bags at both ends, and, when "they are upon the water, lay faſcines upon "them, and cover them with earth. I will "make you preſently ſenſible, continues he, that "you cannot ſink, for every bag will bear up "two men, and the faſcines and the earth will "prevent them from ſlipping."

FROM thence they advanced through a plain, and in three days march made fifteen paraſangas, Teribazus following them with his forces, at the diſtance of about ten ſtadia, when they came to a palace ſurrounded with many villages abounding in all ſorts of proviſions. While they lay

lay encamped in this place, there fell ſo great a ſnow in the night, that it was reſolved the next morning the ſoldiers, with their generals, ſhould remove into the villages, and quarter there; for no enemy appeared, and the great quantity of ſnow ſeemed a ſecurity to them. Here they found all ſorts of good proviſions, ſuch as cattle, corn, old wines exceeding fragrant, raiſins and legumens of all kinds. In the mean time, ſome of the men who had ſtraggled from the camp, brought word that they had ſeen an army, and that in the night many fires appeared. For this reaſon the generals thought it not ſafe for the troops to quarter in the villages at a diſtance from one another, ſo reſolved to bring the army together. Upon this they re-aſſembled, and it was determined to encamp abroad. While they paſſed the night in this camp, there fell ſo great a quantity of ſnow, that it covered both the arms and the men as they lay upon the ground; the ſumpter horſes alſo were ſo benumbed with the ſnow, that it was with difficulty they were made to riſe. It was a miſerable ſight to ſee the men lie upon the ground, ſtill covered with ſnow. But when Xenophon was ſo hardy as to riſe naked, and rive wood, immediately another got up, and, taking the wood from him, cleft it himſelf. Upon this they all roſe up, and, making fires, anointed themſelves; for they found there many ſorts of ointments which ſerved them inſtead of oil, as hogs-greaſe, oil of ſeſame, of bitter almonds, and of turpentine.

THE

THE next day the Greeks marched away with the proviſions they had taken, but apprehending ſome danger in the deſcent to Trebiſond, (for it was a ſteep and narrow defile) they placed a falſe ambuſcade. A certain Myſian by birth as well as name, taking four or five Cretans with him, ſtopped in a thicket, affecting an endeavour to conceal himſelf from the enemy, while the flaſhing of their brazen bucklers diſcovered them here and there. The enemy, therefore, ſeeing this, were afraid of it, as of a real ambuſcade; in the mean time the army deſcended. As ſoon as the Myſian judged they were advanced far enough, he gave the ſignal to his companions to fly in all haſte, and he himſelf leaving the thicket, fled, and they with him. The Cretans, expecting to be overtaken, left the road, and, rolling down into the valleys, got ſafe to a wood. But the Myſian keeping the road, called out for help, when ſome ran to his aſſiſtance and brought him off wounded. Theſe, after they had reſcued him, retreated ſlowly, though expoſed to the enemy's miſſive weapons, while ſome of the Cretans diſcharged their arrows in return. Thus they all arrived at the camp in ſafety.

WHILE Xenophon was thus employed, the generals and captains came from Ariſtarchus, and brought

brought word that he had ſent them away, for the preſent, but had ordered them to come back to him in the evening. This made the treachery ſtill more manifeſt; Xenophon, therefore, finding the ſacrifices promiſed ſecurity both to himſelf and the army, in going to Seuthes, took with him Polycrates the Athenian, one of the captains, and from each of the generals, except Neon, a perſon in whom they confided, and went that night to the army of Seuthes, which lay at the diſtance of ſixty ſtadia. When they drew near to it, he found ſeveral fires, but nobody near them, which made him at firſt conclude that Seuthes had decamped; but, hearing a noiſe, and the men calling out to one another, he underſtood that Seuthes had, for this reaſon, ordered fires to be made before his night guards, that they being in the dark might not be ſeen, neither might it be known where they were; while thoſe who approached the camp could not be concealed, but were diſcovered by the light. Obſerving this, he ſent the interpreter, whom he happened to have with him, and ordered him to acquaint Seuthes, that Xenophon was there, and deſired a conference with him. They aſked whether it was Xenophon the Athenian, one of the army; and, upon his ſaying it was he, they returned with great alacrity, and, preſently after, about two hundred targeteers appeared, who conducted Xenophon and his company to Seuthes. They found him in a caſtle, very much upon his guard, and round the caſtle ſtood horſes ready bridled; for, living in continual fear, he fed his horſes in the day-time, and ſtood upon his guard all night. It was reported that formerly Teres, the anceſtor of this man, having entered this country with a conſiderable army, loſt

loſt great numbers of his men, and was ſtripped of his baggage by the inhabitants: they are called Thynians, and of all people, are ſaid to be the moſt dangerous enemies in the night.

Cæſar having firſt ſent away his own horſe, and afterwards thoſe of all his officers, that by making the danger equal, no hope might remain but in victory; encourages his men, and begun the charge. The Romans, who fought with the advantage of the higher ground, pouring their darts upon the enemy from above, eaſily broke their phalanx, and then fell upon them ſword in hand. What greatly incumbered the Gauls in this fight, was, that their targets being many of them pierced and pinned together by the javelins of the Romans, they could neither draw out the javelins, becauſe forked at the extremity, nor act with agility in the battle, becauſe deprived in a manner of the uſe of their left arms; ſo that many, after long toſſing their targets to and fro to no purpoſe to diſengage them, choſe rather to throw them away and expoſe themſelves without defence to the weapons of their enemies. At length however being overpowered with wounds, they began to give ground; and obſerving a mountain at about a mile's diſtance, gradually retreated thither. Having gained the mountain, and our men purſuing them, the Boians and Tulingians, who to the number of fifteen thouſand, covered their retreat, and ſerved as a guard to their rear, falling upon the Romans in flank; as they advanced,

began

began to ſurround them. This being perceived by the Helvetians, who had retired to the mountain; they again returned upon us, and renewed the fight. The Romans facing about, charged the enemy in three bodies; their firſt and ſecond line, making head againſt thoſe who had been forced to retreat, and their third ſuſtaining the aſſault of the Boians and Tulingians. The battle was bloody, and continued for a long time doubtful; but the enemy being at laſt obliged to give way, one part withdrew towards the hill, whither they had before retreated, and the reſt ſheltered themſelves behind the carriages. During this whole action, though it laſted from nine o'clock in the forenoon, till evening, no man ſaw the back of an enemy. The fight was renewed with great obſtinacy, at the carriages, and continued till the night was far ſpent; for the Gauls making uſe of their carts by way of a rampart, darted their javelins upon us from above: and ſome thruſting their lances through the wheels of the waggons, wounded our men. Only a hundred and twenty thouſand of the enemy ſurvived this defeat.

Cæſar then ſaid,

"THAT he was therefore reſolved to execute "without delay, what he otherwiſe intended to "have put off a little longer, and would give or"ders for decamping the very next night, three "hours before day, that he might as ſoon as poſ"ſible, know whether honour and a ſenſe of duty, "or an ignominious cowardice, had the aſcen-

"dant

"dant in his army: Nay, that ſhould all the reſt "of his troops abandon him, he would never- "theleſs march with the tenth legion alone, "of whoſe fidelity and courage, he had no man- "ner of doubt, and which would ſerve him for "his Pretorian guard." Cæſar had always principally favoured this legion, and placed his chief confidence in it, on account of its valour. This ſpeech made a wonderful change upon the minds of all, and begot an uncommon alacrity and eagerneſs for the war. The tenth legion in particular, returned him thanks by their tribunes, for the favourable opinion he had expreſſed of them, and aſſured him of their readineſs to follow him. Nor were the other legions leſs induſtrious, by their tribunes and principal centurions, to reconcile themſelves to Cæſar, proteſting they had never either doubted or feared, nor ever imagined that it belonged to them, but to the general, to direct in matters of war.

CÆSAR having encouraged the tenth legion, haſtened to the right wing of the army; he there found his men overpowered by the enemy; the Enſigns of the twelfth legion, all crouded into one place, and the ſoldiers themſelves ſtanding ſo cloſe together, that they had not room to uſe their arms; all the centurions of the fourth cohort, ſlain; the ſtandard bearer killed, and the ſtandard taken; the centurions of the other cohorts, almoſt all either killed or dangerouſly wounded; among theſe, P. Sextius Baculus, the firſt centurion of the

the legion, a man of great courage, ſo weakened by the multitude of his wounds, that he was hardly able to ſupport himſelf; the reſt diſcouraged and avoiding the fight, and ſome even running away, becauſe abandoned by the troops that were to ſuſtain them; the enemy preſſing vigorouſly in front from the lower ground, and at the ſame time flanking the legions on either ſide, with great fury; in a word, things reduced to the laſt extremity, and no body of reſerve to reſtore the battle. Whereupon, ſnatching a buckler from a ſoldier who ſtood in the rear of the legion, for he himſelf was come thither without one, and preſſing to the front of the battle, he called the centurions by name, encouraged the reſt, and commanded the ſoldiers to advance the enſigns, and widen their ranks, that they might be the more at liberty to uſe their ſwords. His arrival inſpiring the men with hope, and reviving their courage, as every one was ambitious of diſtinguiſhing himſelf in the preſence of his general, and even in his greateſt extremity, redoubled his efforts; the progreſs of the enemy was a little checked.

CÆSAR obſerving that the ſeventh legion, which fought at ſome diſtance from the other, was likewiſe very much preſſed by the enemy, commanded the military tribunes to draw the two legions together by degrees, and joining them back to back, oppoſe the enemy with a double front. This being done, as they were now in a condition to ſupport each other, and no longer feared being ſurrounded, they began to make a more vigorous oppoſition, and fight with greater courage.

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IN theſe two veſſels belonging to Cæſar, were about three hundred ſoldiers, who having landed, and being upon their march to the camp; the Morini, who had ſubmitted to Cæſar upon his ſetting out for Britain, drawn by the hopes of plunder, ſurrounded them at firſt with only a few men, and ordered them to lay down their arms, under pain of being put to the ſword. But they caſting themſelves into an orb, ſtood upon their defence; when all on a ſudden, ſix thouſand more of the enemy appeared rouzed by the noiſe of the combatants. Cæſar having notice of what paſſed, ſent all his cavalry to the aſſiſtance of the Romans. Meanwhile our men withſtood all the attacks of the enemy, and bravely maintained the fight for upwards of ſix hours, having ſlain great numbers of the Morini, while, on their ſide only a few were wounded. But no ſooner did our cavalry appear, than the enemy throwing down their arms, betook themſelves to flight, and were almoſt all ſlain in the purſuit.

THE Roman General thus diſputed:

THE Council was then going to riſe: but the officers ſurrounding their generals, conjured them not to put all to hazard, by their diſſention and obſtinacy. They told them, "That whatever "reſolution was taken, whether to go or ſtay, "the

"the danger was by no means great, provided "they acted with union among themſelves; but "their diſagreement threatened the troops with "inevitable deſtruction." The debate continued till midnight, when at length, Cotta, vanquiſhed by importunity, yielded to the opinion of Sabinus. Orders were given for marching by break of day. The remainder of the night was none of it employed in ſleep; each man being taken up in chooſing what things to carry along with him, and what of his winter neceſſaries to leave behind. In ſhort, they did every thing to make their ſtay more dangerous; and by their fatigue and want of reſt, incapacitate themſelves for a vigorous defence upon their march.

THEN at length Titurius, like one who had neglected all the neceſſary precautions, unable to hide his concern, ran up and down among the troops, and began to diſpoſe them in order of battle; but with an air ſo timid and diſconcerted, that it appeared he had no hopes of ſucceſs, as happens for the moſt part to thoſe who leave all to the laſt moment of execution. But Cotta, who had foreſeen that this might happen, and had therefore oppoſed the departure of the troops, omitted nothing in his power for the common ſafety; calling to and encouraging the men like an able general, at the ſame time fighting with the bravery of a common ſoldier. And becauſe the great length of the column, rendered it difficult for the Lieutenants to remedy all diſorders, and

and repair expeditiously enough to the places where their presence was necessary; orders were given to suit the defence of the baggage, and form into an orb.

This disposition, though not improper in these circumstances, had nevertheless very unhappy consequences; for being considered as the effect of terror and despair, it discouraged our men, and augmented the confidence of the enemy. Besides, as unavoidably happens on such occasions, many of the soldiers quitting their ensigns, hastened to fetch from the baggage, what they had most of value, and filled all parts with uproar and lamentation.

THE Gauls meanwhile conducted themselves with great prudence, their Officers proclaimed through the ranks, "That not a man should "stir from his post; that the booty was theirs, "and every thing belonging to the Romans, must "certainly fall into their hands; but that all de-"pended upon securing the victory." Our men were not inferior to the enemy, either in valour, number, or way of fighting. Though they had neither general nor fortune on their side, they hoped still by their bravery to surmount all difficulties; and whenever any of the cohorts sallied out, so as to join the enemy hand to hand, a considerable slaughter of the Gauls ensued. This being perceived by Ambiorix, he ordered his men to cast their darts at a distance, to avoid a close fight, retire before the Romans wherever they advanced,

vanced, and purſue them as they returned to their ſtandards, in which way of fighting they were become ſo expert, by the lightneſs of their arms and daily exerciſe, that it was impoſſible to do them any hurt. Theſe orders were exactly followed; inſomuch, that when the cohort left the orb, and came forward to attack the enemy, they retreated and diſperſed in a moment; meanwhile it uncovered its own flanks, and expoſed them to the darts on either ſide. The danger was ſtill greater when they returned; for then, not only the troops that ſtood next them, but thoſe who had retired before them, ſurrounded and charged them on all ſides. If, on the contrary, they choſe to continue in their poſt; neither could their valour any thing avail them, nor was it poſſible for men ſtanding ſo cloſe together, to avoid the darts of ſo great a multitude. And yet, notwithſtanding all theſe diſadvantages, and the many wounds they had received, they ſtill maintained their ground; and though much of the day was now ſpent, the fight having continued from ſun-riſe, till two in the afternoon, they did nothing in all that time, unworthy of the dignity of the Roman name. At length, T. Balventius, who the year before had been made firſt centurion of a legion, a man of diſtinguiſhed courage, and great authority among the troops, had both his thighs pierced with a dart. Q. Lucanius, an officer of the ſame rank, endeavouring to reſcue his ſon, whom he ſaw ſurrounded by the enemy, was killed, after a brave reſiſtance. And L. Cotta the Lieutenant, encouraging the ſeveral cohorts and companies, received a blow on the mouth from a ſling: thus the defeat was compleat.

M. PE-

M. PETREIUS a centurion, who had endeavoured to force the gates, finding himſelf overpowered by the enemy, and deſpairing of ſafety, becauſe he was already covered with wounds, turning to his ſoldiers that had followed him, ſaid: "As I find it impoſſible to preſerve both myſelf "and you, I will at leaſt do my beſt to further "your eſcape, whom I have brought into this "danger, through too eager a deſire of glory. "Take advantage therefore of the preſent oppor-"tunity." Then throwing himſelf upon the enemy, he killed two, drove the reſt from the gate, and ſeeing his men run to his aſſiſtance, "In "vain, ſays he, do you endeavour to preſerve my "life. My blood and ſtrength forſake me. "Go therefore while you may, and rejoin your "legion." Continuing ſtill to fight, he expired ſoon after, preſerving his followers with the loſs of his own life.

VERCINGETORIX obſerving theſe motions from the citadel of Aleſia, led forth his troops, carrying along with him the faſcines, long poles, covered galleries, hooks, and other inſtruments he had prepared for the aſſault. The fight was maintained at all ſides at once; nor did the Gauls leave any thing unattempted, but flocked con-

tinually to theſe parts of the works which appeared to be the weakeſt. The Roman forces having ſo many works to guard, were diſperſed in different places, and ſcarce ſufficed for the defence of them all. What moſtly contributed to diſturb them, was, the cries of the combatants behind, which informed them, that their ſafety depended on the valour of others. For ſuch is the conſtitution of the human mind, as always to aggrandize abſent objects, and magnify the danger that is out of ſight.

MEANWHILE, Cæſar detached the cavalry of Rheims, of the Ligones and the other provinces of Gaul, of which he had great numbers in his camp, to guard by turns the foragers, and protect them from the ſudden incurſions of the enemy. This was done every day, but cuſtom by degrees relaxing their diligence, as frequently happens in things of long continuance; the Bellovaci, who had obſerved the daily ſtations of our horſe, placed a choſen body of foot in ambuſh in a wood, and ſent their cavalry thither next day, to draw our men into the ſnare, and then attack them ſurrounded on every ſide. This ill fortune fell upon the cavalry of Rheims, whoſe turn it was next day to guard the foragers: for theſe ſuddenly diſcovering the enemies cavalry, and deſpiſing their ſmall numbers, purſued with ſuch eagerneſs, that they were at length ſurprized and ſurrounded by the foot. This threw them into confuſion,

confuſion, and obliged them to retreat haſtily, with the loſs of Vertiſcus their general, and the chief man of their ſtate; who though ſo far advanced in years, that he could hardly ſit on horſeback, yet according to the cuſtom of the Gauls, would neither decline the command on account of his age, nor ſuffer them to fight without him. The enemy were animated and encouraged, on account of this ſucceſs, and the death of the chief and general of the Rhemi: our men on the other hand, were cautioned by their loſs, carefully to examine the ground before they took their poſts, and purſue a retreating enemy with more reſerve.

THE ſame day, Cæſar detached a great part of his cavalry over the river; who following unexpectedly upon the enemies foragers, diſperſed up and down without a ſuſpicion of danger, made a conſiderable capture of men and horſes; and obſerving ſome Spaniſh cohorts, on the march to their aſſiſtance, ſkilfully divided themſelves into two bodies; one to ſecure the booty, the other to receive and return the enemy's charge. One of their cohorts which had raſhly ſeparated from the reſt, and advanced too far before the main body, was ſurrounded and cut to pieces by our men, who returned over the ſame bridge to the camp, without loſs, and enriched with a conſiderable booty.

CÆSAR moved by their alacrity and intrepidity, though he ſaw ſome danger in expoſing his army to the rapidity of a deep river, judged it yet proper to attempt and make trial of the paſſage. Having therefore withdrawn from every company, ſuch as were weak of body, or of leſs courage than the reſt, he left them in the camp, with a legion and all the baggage. The reſt of the army happily paſſed the river, by the aſſiſtance of a double line of cavalry, placed above and below them. Some of the infantry were carried away by the violence of the current, but they were picked up and ſaved by the horſe below them; ſo that not one man was loſt. Having paſſed the river without loſs, he drew up his army in order of battle, and began to purſue the enemy in three lines: and ſuch was the ardour of the ſoldiers, that notwithſtanding the army was obliged to make a circuit of ſix miles, notwithſtanding the time neceſſarily loſt in croſſing the river, they got up at the ninth hour of the day to the enemy, who had ſet out at midnight.

THIS reſolution being take[illegible] Curio, and eting with a general approbati[illegible] ſome of the enſmen, who had deſerted to C[illegible]io, informed n, that the war in which Juba was engaged

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with the Leptitani, having obliged him to return into his own kingdom, he had only ſent his Lieutenant Sabura, with a ſmall body of forces, to the aſſiſtance of the Uticans. Upon this intelligence, to which he too haſtily gave credit, he changed his deſign, and reſolved to give battle. The fire of youth, his courage, good ſucceſs, and ſelf-confidence, contributed greatly to confirm him in this reſolution. Urged by theſe conſiderations, about the beginning of the night, he ſent all his cavalry towards the enemy's camp, which was upon the river Bagradas, and where Sabura, of whom we have ſpoken before, commanded in chief. But the king followed with all his forces, and was not above ſix miles behind him. The cavalry which Curio had detached, marched all night, and coming unexpectedly upon the enemy, attacked them before they were ready to receive the charge; for the Numidians, according to the cuſtom of that barbarous country, were encamped without order or rule. Falling upon them therefore in this confuſion, and oppreſſed with ſleep, they ſlew great numbers, and obliged the reſt to fly in the utmoſt conſternation: after which they returned to Curio, with the priſoners they had taken.

CURIO perceiving the general alarm, and that neither his exhortations nor prayers were regarded, ordered the troops to retire with the ſtandards, to the neareſt mountains, as the only reſource in the preſent exigence. But the cavalry

detached by Sabura, had already ſeized them. All hope being now loſt, ſome were ſlain, endeavouring to fly: others threw themſelves upon the ground, partly in deſpair, partly unable to make any efforts for their own ſafety. At this moment, Cn. Domitius, who commanded the horſe, addreſſing Curio, entreated him to regain his camp with the few cavalry that remained, promiſing not to abandon him. "Can I, ſays Curio, "look Cæſar in the face, after having loſt an "army he had committed to my charge?" ſo ſaying, he continued fighting till he was ſlain.

TWO of Cæſar's tranſports, unable to keep up with the reſt, were overtaken by the night; and not knowing where the fleet had put in, caſt anchor over againſt Liſſus. Otacilius Craſſus, who commanded in the place, ſent out ſome boats and ſmall veſſels to attack them: at the ſame time he urged them to a ſurrender, promiſing quarter to ſuch as would ſubmit. One of theſe veſſels carried two hundred and twenty new-raiſed ſoldiers; the other leſs than two hundred veteans. On this occaſion appeared, how great a defence againſt danger reſults from firmneſs of mind. The new levies, frightened at the number of their adverſaries, and fatigued with ſea ſickneſs, ſurrendered on promiſe of their lives. But when they were brought to Otacilius, regardleſs of the oath he had taken, he ordered them all to be cruelly ſlain in his preſence. The veterans on the contrary, though they had both

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the ſtorm and a leaky veſſel to ſtruggle with, abated nothing of their wonted bravery; but having ſpun out the time till night, under pretence of treating, obliged the pilot to run the veſſel aſhore; where, finding an advantageous poſt, they continued the remainder of the night. At daybreak, Otacilius detached againſt them about four-hundred horſe, who guarded that part of the coaſt, and purſued them with ſword in hand; but they defended themſelves with great bravery, and having ſlain ſome of the enemy, rejoined without loſs the reſt of the troops.

THE next day, Cæſar drew out all his forces, formed them before his camp, and offered Pompey battle. Finding that he kept within his lines, he led back his troops, and began to think of purſuing other meaſures. Accordingly on the morrow, by a long circuit, and through very narrow and difficult ways, he marched with all his forces to Dyrrhachium, hoping either to oblige Pompey to follow him thither, or cut off his communication with the towns where he laid up all his proviſions, and magazines of war; which happened accordingly. For Pompey, at firſt, not penetrating his deſign, becauſe he counterfeited a route different from what he really intended, imagined he had been obliged to decamp for want of proviſions; but being afterwards informed of the truth by his ſcouts, he quitted his camp next day, in hopes to prevent him, by taking a nearer way. Cæſar ſuſpecting what might happen, ex-

horted his ſoldiers to bear the fatigue patiently; and allowing them to repoſe during only a ſmall part of the night, arrived next morning at Dyrrhachium, where he immediately formed a camp, juſt as Pompey's van began to appear at a diſtance.

IN this new method of making war, new ſtratagems were every day put in practice, by both generals. Pompey's ſoldiers obſerving by the fires, the place where our cohorts were upon guard, ſtole thither privately by night, and pouring upon them a flight of arrows, retired inſtantly to their camp; which obliged our men to have fires in one place, and keep guard in another.

THUS there happened no leſs than ſix actions in one day, three near Dyrrhachium, and three about the lines. In computing the number of the ſlain, it appeared that Pompey loſt two thouſand men, with ſeveral volunteers and centurions, among whom was Valerius Flaccus, the ſon of Lucius, who had formerly been Prætor of Aſia. We gained ſix ſtandards, with the loſs of no more than twenty men in all the attacks: But in the fort, not a ſoldier eſcaped being wounded; and four centurions belonging to one cohort loſt their eyes. As a proof of the danger they had been expoſed

expoſed to, and the efforts they had ſuſtained, they brought and counted to Cæſar about thirty thouſand arrows that had been ſhot into the fort; and ſhewed him the centurion Scæva's buckler, which was pierced in two hundred and thirty places. Cæſar, as a reward for his ſervices, both to himſelf and the republick, preſented him with two hundred thouſand aſſes, and advanced him directly from the eighth rank of captains, to the firſt; it appearing, that the preſervation of the fort, was chiefly owing to his valour. He alſo diſtributed military rewards among the other Officers and ſoldiers of that cohort; and aſſigned them double pay, and double allowance of corn.

BUT as Cæſar was drawing off his men, the garriſon made a ſudden ſally, and Juba's horſe, whom he had ſent to receive their pay, happening juſt then to come up, they jointly took poſſeſſion of the camp Cæſar had left, and began to harraſs his rear. This being perceived, the legionaries immediately halted; and the cavalry, though few in number, boldly charged the vaſt numbers of the enemy. On this occaſion it was, that leſs than thirty Gallic horſe, by an incredible and aſtoniſhing effort of valour, repulſed two thouſand Moors, and drove them quite into the town.

CÆSAR'S departure, occaſioned the utmoſt

ſadneſs and conſternation among the troops; for being few in number, moſtly new levies, and thoſe not all ſuffered to land; they ſaw themſelves expoſed upon a foreign coaſt, to the mighty forces of a crafty nation, ſupported by an innumerable cavalry. Nor had they any reſource in their preſent circumſtances, or expectation of ſafety in their own conduct; but derived all their hope from the alacrity, vigour, and wonderful chearfulneſs that appeared in the general's countenance: for he was of an intrepid ſpirit, and behaved with undaunted reſolution and confidence. On his conduct therefore they entirely relied, and promiſed themſelves to a man, that under ſo able and experienced a leader, all difficulties would vaniſh before them.

CÆSAR having ſuch an enemy to deal with, was neceſſitated to inſtruct his ſoldiers; not like a general of a veteran army, which had been victorious in ſo many battles; but like a fencing-maſter, training up his gladiators: with what foot he muſt advance or retire, when they were to oppoſe and make good their ground; when to counterfeit an attack; at what place, and in what manner to lance their javelins. For the enemy's light armed troops gave wonderful trouble and diſquiet to our army; becauſe they not only deterred the cavalry from the encounter, by killing their horſes with their javelins, but likewiſe wearied out the legionary ſoldiers by their ſwiftneſs: for as often as theſe heavy-armed troops advanced to attack them, they evaded the danger by a quick retreat.

retreat. This gave Cæſar no ſmall trouble: becauſe, as often as he engaged with his cavalry, without being ſuſtained by the infantry, he found himſelf by no means a match for the enemies horſe, ſupported by their light-armed foot: and as he had no experience of the ſtrength of their legions, he foreſaw ſtill greater difficulties, when theſe ſhould be united, as the ſhock muſt then be wonderful. The number too, and ſize of the elephants, greatly increaſed the terror of the ſoldiers; for which however he found a remedy, in cauſing ſome of thoſe animals to be brought over from Italy, that his men might be accuſtomed to the ſight of them, know their ſtrength and courage, and in what part of the body they were moſt eaſily to be wounded. For as the elephants are covered with trappings and ornaments, it was neceſſary to inform them what parts of the body remained naked, that they might direct their darts thither. It was likewiſe needful to familiarize his horſes to the cry, ſmell, and figure of theſe animals, in all which he ſucceeded to a wonder: for the ſoldiers quickly came to touch them with their hands, and to be ſenſible of their tardineſs; and the cavalry attacked them with blunted darts, and by degrees brought their horſes to endure their preſence. For theſe reaſons already mentioned, Cæſar was not without his anxieties, and proceeded with more ſlowneſs and circumſpection than uſual, abating conſiderably of his wonted expedition and celerity. Nor ought we to wonder, for in Gaul his troops had been accuſtomed to fight in a champaign country, againſt an open undeſigning enemy, who deſpiſed artifice, and valued themſelves only on their bravery. But now he was to habituate his ſoldiers to the arts and con-

trivances of a crafty enemy, and teach them what to purſue, and what to avoid. The ſooner therefore to inſtruct them in theſe matters, he took care not to confine his legions to one place, but under pretence of foraging, engaged them in frequent marches, and counter-marches; knowing well, that the enemy would take care not to loſe ſight of him. Three days after, he drew up his forces with great art, and marching paſt Scipio's camp, waited for him in an open plain; but ſeeing that he ſtill declined a battle, he retreated to his camp in the evening.

WHEN Cæſar came to the place, he found Scipio's army in order of battle, before the intrenchments, the elephants poſted before the intrenchments on the two wings, and part of the ſoldiers employed in fortifying the camp. Upon ſight of this diſpoſition, he drew up his army in three lines, placed the ſecond and tenth legions in the right wing, the eighth and ninth legions in the left, five legions in the center, covered his flanks with five cohorts poſted over againſt the elephants, diſpoſed the archers and ſlingers in the two wings, and intermingled the light-armed troops with his cavalry. He himſelf, on foot, went from rank to rank, to rouſe the courage of the veterans, putting them in mind of their former bravery, and animating them by his ſoothing addreſs. He exhorted the new levies to emulate the bravery of the veterans, and endeavour by a victory to attain the ſame degree of glory and renown.

nown. As he ran from rank to rank, he obſerved the enemy very uneaſy, hurrying from place to place; one while retiring behind the rampart, another, coming out again in great tumult and confuſion. As the ſame was obſerved by many in the army, his lieutenants and volunteers begged him to give the ſign of battle, as the immortal Gods promiſed him a certain victory. While he heſitated with himſelf, and ſtrove to repreſs their eagerneſs and deſires, as being unwilling to yield to the importunity of men, whoſe duty it was to wait his orders; on a ſudden, a trumpet in the right wing, without his leave, and compelled by the ſoldiers, ſounded a charge. Upon this, all the cohorts ran to battle, in ſpite of the endeavours of the centurions, who ſtrove to reſtrain them by force, but to no purpoſe. Cæſar perceiving that the ardour of his ſoldiers would admit of no reſtraint, giving good fortune for the word, ſpurred on his horſe, and charged the enemy's front; on the right wing, the archers and ſlingers poured their javelins without intermiſſion upon the elephants, and by the noiſe of their ſlings and ſtones, ſo terrified theſe unruly animals, that turning upon their own men, they trod them down in heaps, and ruſhed through the gates of the camp. At the ſame time, the Mauritanian horſe, who were in the ſame wing with the elephants, ſeeing themſelves deprived of their aſſiſtance, betook themſelves to flight. Whereupon the legions wheeling round the elephants, ſoon maſtered the enemies intrenchments. Some few that made reſiſtance were ſlain; the reſt fled with all expedition to the camp they had quitted the day before. And here we muſt not omit taking notice of the bravery of a ſoldier of the fifth legion. For when

when an elephant, which had been wounded in the left wing, and roufed to fury by the pain, ran againſt an unarmed ſutler, threw him under his feet, and leaning on him with his whole weight, brandiſhing his trunk, and raiſing hideous cries, cruſhed him to death; the ſoldier could not refrain from attacking the animal. The elephant ſeeing him advance with his javelin in his hand, quitted the dead body of the ſutler, ſeized him with his trunk, wheeled him round in the air. But the ſoldier, amidſt all the danger loſing nothing of his courage, ceaſed not with his ſword to ſtrike at the elephant's trunk, who at laſt, overcome with the pain, quitted his prey, and fled to the reſt with hideous cries.

CÆSAR, who was no ſtranger to the merit of that people, and their conſtant attachment to the Romans, detached about nine at night eleven cohorts, with a like number of horſe, under the command of L. Julius Paciecus, a good officer, well known in the province, and who was beſides perfectly acquainted with the country. When he arrived at Pompey's quarters, a dreadful tempeſt ariſing, attended with a violent wind, ſo great a darkneſs enſued, that it was difficult to diſtinguiſh even the perſon next you. This accident proved of great advantage to Paciecus; for being arrived at Pompey's camp, he ordered the cavalry to advance two by two, and march directly through the enemies quarters to the town. Some of their guards calling to know who paſſed, one of

of our troopers bid them be ſilent, for they were juſt then endeavouring by ſtealth to approach the wall, in order to get poſſeſſion of the town; and partly by this anſwer, partly by favour of the tempeſt, which hindered the centinels from examining things diligently, they were ſuffered to paſs without diſturbance. When they reached the gates, upon a ſignal given, they were admitted; and both horſe and foot raiſing a mighty ſhout, after leaving ſome troops to guard the town, ſallied in a body upon the enemy's camp, who having no apprehenſion of ſuch an attack, were almoſt all like to have been taken priſoners.

THE Eaſt India Company's agents at Fort St. David had gained very little intelligence neceſſary to direct Mr. Boſcawen in his operations; for when the army, approaching near the bounds of Pondicherry, came in ſight of the fort of Ariancopang, there was no perſon who could give a deſcription of the place; however, it was determined it ſhould be taken before the army proceeded any further. An engineer of the Company's troops was ordered to reconnoitre it, but was afraid to go near enough to make certain obſervations; he however reported, that the fort itſelf was of little ſtrength, but that it was covered by an intrenchment. A deſerter likewiſe reported, that it was garriſoned only by 100 Sepoys: On which, Mr. Boſcawen determined to ſtorm the place. Accordingly a detachment of 700 men marched at daybreak againſt the eaſt

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ſide of the fort, to attack what they ſuppoſed, the entrenchment, which on a nearer approach they diſcovered to be a heap of ruins; they likewiſe perceived, that the fort itſelf was a triangle regularly fortified with three cavaliers, a deep dry ditch full of pit-falls, and a covered way. Theſe works were ſufficient to protect the place from a ſudden onſet, even had it been only garriſoned as the deſerter had reported; inſtead of which it was defended by 100 Europeans, and 300 Sepoys, under the command of Captain Law, an active officer. The Engliſh troops were immediately aſſailed from the walls with muſquetry, and grape ſhot; and although they had brought no ſcaling ladders, the fear of ſhame kept them in reach of the enemy's fire, until 150 were either killed or wounded.

LIEUTENANT Clive offered his ſervice to Major Lawrence, to lead the attack; and the Major, who had remarked the riſing military genius of this officer, very readily gave him the poſt of honour he requeſted. A platoon of 34 Europeans, with 700 Sepoys, were appointed for this ſervice, who were to be ſupported by the whole army, as ſoon as the entrenchment ſhould be carried. The Europeans marching at the head of the Sepoys, croſſed the rivulet with difficulty, and four of them were killed by the fire from the fort, before they gained the oppoſite bank. As ſoon as a part of the Sepoys had paſſed likewiſe, Lieutenant Clive advanced briſkly with the Europeans, intending

intending to attack the intrenchment in flank, at that end where the Cooleys had diſcontinued the work. The Sepoys who had paſſed the rivulet, inſtead of following cloſely as they were ordered, remained at the bank, waiting until they were joined by greater numbers. The enemy perceived this neglect, which left the rear of the Europeans expoſed: a number of horſe were concealed along the ſouth ſide of the fort, between the projections of the towers; the neareſt of which was not more than forty yards from that part of the entrenchment which Lieutenant Clive was preparing to attack. Juſt as his men were preſenting their muſkets to fire, a party of horſe ruſhed ſword in hand from behind the tower; and by a rapid evolution, which manifeſted the excellency both of the horſes and the riders, fell on the rear of the platoon with ſo much impetuoſity, that the men had no time to face about and defend themſelves, and in an inſtant twenty-ſix of the platoon were cut to pieces. A horſeman had his ſword uplifted to ſtrike Lieutenant Clive, who eſcaped the blow, by ſtepping on one ſide, while the horſe paſſed him; he then ran towards the Sepoys, whom he had the good fortune to join, being one of four who were all that eſcaped from this ſlaughter. He found the Sepoys drawn up in order, but they had not advanced a ſtep to ſupport the platoon. The Tanjorine horſe, ſatisfied with their ſucceſs, did not proſecute their advantage, by attacking the Sepoys, but returned to the ſtations from whence they had made the onſet.

AFTER this exploit, the Marattas went out ſeveral days ſucceſſively, to reconnoitre; and Innis Khan having obſerved that the French dragoons were much more alert than any of Chunda Saheb's cavalry, mounting and advancing on every alarm, he formed the deſign of drawing them into an ambuſcade; and having communicated his plan to Captain Gingen, a party of Europeans, with two field pieces, were detached before day, who entering a large and deep watercourſe, which runs acroſs the plain, to the ſouth of the city, concealed themſelves in it, within 400 yards of the French rock, and at the ſame time, Innis Khan, with 300 horſemen, marched out from his encampment on the weſt ſide of the town. The ſurface of the plain round Tritchinopoly is very uneven, and full of hollow ways. The Maratta taking a large circuit, placed his men in a hollow, where, when diſmounted, they could not be perceived either from the French rock, or that in the city. Every thing remained quiet in both camps until noon, when 40 Marattas, mounted on the beſt horſes, ſet out from the camp, and keeping out of cannon ſhot of the French rock, proceeded to the eaſtward of it, and then galloped ſword in hand directly to the enemy's camp, where they made no ſmall hurry and confuſion, either cutting down or driving all the foragers they met, quite up to the tents. This provoking the French, 60 dragoons ſallied, and were followed ſlowly by 400 of Chunda Saheb's cavalry. The Marattas retreated leiſurely

ſurely before them, halting as they halted, but always keeping at the diſtance of muſket ſhot from them: and in this manner they led the enemy as far as the French rock, when Mr. Piſchard, a brave officer, exaſperated at the repeated defiances of ſuch a handful of men, formed his troop, and leaving the Mooriſh cavalry, ſet out in purſuit of them at full ſpeed. They now flew before the dragoons, until they had led them inſenſibly out of the reach of the French artillery on the rock, and beyond their own party in ambuſcade; when theſe mounting in an inſtant, ſallied from the hollow way, and charged the dragoons impetuouſly in the rear, whilſt the flying party wheeling, attacked them with equal fury in front. The action was over in an inſtant, the French had only time to diſcharge a few piſtols, and were all cut to pieces, excepting 10, who had not been able to keep up with the reſt. The detachment of Chunda Saheb's cavalry, either from cowardice or ſuſpicion of the ſtratagem, never ſtirred from the rock; but the officer who commanded in that poſt, detached 100 men, to ſecure his unfortunate friends. Lieutenant Truſler poſted in the intrenchment oppoſite the rock, ſeeing them march, and not knowing the ſucceſs of the Marattas, immediately advanced with the company of Coffrees, to oblige the party to return, who finding all loſt on the plain, haſtened back and ſaved the rock, which Truſler was on the point of carrying. The ſucceſs of this ambuſcade diſpirited the enemy ſo much, that they ſuffered their dead to lay on the plain, without venturing out to bury them; and when, two days after, the Engliſh went to perform this charitable office, they found the bodies devoured by the Jackals.

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THE fate of the two armies depended, in a great meaſure, upon the ſucceſs or miſcarriage of this convoy and reinforcement. Captain Clive apprized of Mr. D'Auteuil's intention, ſet out the ſame night, with the greateſt part of his force, to intercept him; but Mr. D'Auteuil receiving advice of his approach, immediately turned back, and regained the fort; on which Captain Clive returned with the utmoſt expedition to Samcavaram, where he arrived in the morning. In the afternoon, Mr. Law got intelligence of his march, without hearing of his return, which could not naturally be ſuſpected, as Uttatoor is thirteen miles from Samcavaram; he therefore, as ſoon as it was dark, detached 80 Europeans, and 700 Sepoys, to attack the few troops he imagined to be remaining there: of theſe men, forty were Engliſh deſerters. This party arrived near the camp at midnight, when one of their ſpies informed the commanding officer, that the troops which had marched againſt Mr. D'Auteuil, were returned; but he, imputing the information either to cowardice or treachery, gave no credit to the ſpy, and proceeded; they were challenged by the advanced guard of Engliſh Sepoys, on which the officer of the deſerters, an Iriſhman, ſtept out and told them, that he was ſent by Major Lawrence, to reinforce Captain Clive: and the reſt of the deſerters ſpeaking Engliſh likewiſe, confirmed the ion, and perſuaded the Sepoys ſo fully, that omitted the uſual precaution of aſking the er-word, which would certainly have diſcovered

covered the ſtratagem; and ſent one of their body to conduct the enemy to the head quarters. They continued their march through a part of the Maratta camp, without giving or receiving any diſturbance until they came to the leſſer pagoda. Here they were challenged by the centinels, and by others who were poſted in a neighbouring choultry, to the north of it, in which Captain Clive was aſleep. They returned the challenge, by a volley into each place, and immediately entered the pagoda, putting all they met to the ſword. Captain Clive ſtarting out of his ſleep, and not conceiving it poſſible that the enemy could have advanced, imputed the firing to his own Sepoys, alarmed by ſome attack at the ſkirts of the camp; he however ran to the upper pagoda, where the greateſt part of his Europeans were quartered, who having likewiſe taken the alarm, were under arms; and he immediately returned with 200 of them to the Choultry. Here he now diſcovered a large body of Sepoys, drawn up facing the ſouth, and firing at random. Their poſition, which looked towards the enemy's camp, joined to their confuſion, confirmed him in his conjecture, that they were his own troops, who had taken ſome unneceſſary alarm. In this ſuppoſition, he drew up his Europeans within twenty yards of their rear, and then going alone amongſt them, ordered the firing to ceaſe, upbraiding ſome with the panic he ſuppoſed them to have taken, and even ſtriking others. At length, one of the Sepoys who underſtood a little of the French language, diſcovering that he was an Engliſhman, attacked and wounded him in two places, with his ſword; but finding himſelf on the point of being overpowered, ran away to

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the lower pagoda: Captain Clive, exaſperated at this inſolence from a man whom he imagined to be in his own ſervice, followed him to the gate, where, to his great ſurprize, he was accoſted by ſix Frenchmen: his uſual preſence of mind did not fail him in this critical occaſion, but ſuggeſting to him all that had happened, he told the Frenchmen with great compoſure, that he was come to offer them terms; and if they would look out, they would perceive the pagoda ſurrounded with his whole army, who were determined to give no quarter, if any reſiſtance was made. The firmneſs with which theſe words were delivered, made ſuch an impreſſion, that three of the Frenchmen ran into the pagoda, to carry this intelligence, whilſt the other three ſurrendered their arms to Captain Clive, and followed him towards the Choultry, whither he haſtened, intending to order the Europeans to attack the body of Sepoys, whom he now firſt knew to be enemies; but theſe had already diſcovered the danger of their ſituation, and had marched out of the reach of the Europeans, who imagining that they did this in obedience to Captain Clive's orders, made no motion to interrupt or attack them. Soon after, eight Frenchmen who had been ſent from the pagoda to reconnoitre, fell in with the Engliſh troops, and were made priſoners; and theſe, with the other three which Captain Clive had taken, were delivered to the charge of a ſerjeant, who not knowing in this time of darkneſs and confuſion, that the enemy were in poſſeſſion of the lower pagoda, carried them thither; and on delivering them to the guard, found out their error; ſuch was alſo the confuſion of the French in the pagoda, that they ſuffered the ſerjeant and his party

party to return unmoleſted. The reſt of the Engliſh troops had now joined the others, and Captain Clive imagining that the enemy would never have attempted ſo deſperate an enterprize, without ſupporting it with their whole army, deemed it abſolutely neceſſary to ſtorm the pagoda, before the troops who were in it could receive any aſſiſtance. One of the two folding doors of the gateway, had for ſome time been taken down to be repaired, and the other was ſtrongly ſtapled down, ſo that the remaining part of the entrance, would admit only two men abreaſt; the Engliſh ſoldiers made the attack, and continued it for ſome time with great reſolution; but the deſerters within fought deſperately, and killed an officer and fifteen men, on which the attack was ordered to ceaſe until day-break; and in the mean time, ſuch a diſpoſition was made, as might prevent thoſe in the pagoda from eſcaping, and at the ſame time oppoſe any other body which might come to their relief. At day-break, the commanding officer of the French, ſeeing the danger of his ſituation, made a ſally at the head of his men, who received ſo heavy a fire, that he himſelf with twelve others, who firſt came out of the gateway, were killed by the volley, on which the reſt ran back into the pagoda. Captain Clive then advanced into the porch of the gate, to parley with the enemy, and being weak with the loſs of blood and fatigue, ſtood with his back to the wall of the porch, and leaned ſtooping forward on the ſhoulders of the two ſerjeants. The officer of the Engliſh deſerters preſented himſelf with great inſolence, and telling Captain Clive with abuſive language, that he would ſhoot him, fired his muſket. The ball miſſed him, but

went through the bodies of both the ſerjeants on whom he was leaning, and they both fell mortally wounded. The Frenchmen had hitherto defended the pagoda, in compliance with the Engliſh deſerters, but thinking it neceſſary to diſavow ſuch an outrage, which might exclude them from any pretenſions to quarter, their officer immediately ſurrendered. By this time, the body of the enemy's Sepoys had paſſed out of the camp, with as little interruption as they had entered it; but orders having been ſent to the Marattas to purſue them, Innis Khan, with all his men, mounted at day-break, and came up with them in the open plain, before they gained the bank of the Coleroon. The Sepoys no ſooner perceived them, than they flung away their arms, and attempted to ſave themſelves by diſperſing; but the Marattas, who never figure ſo much as in theſe cruel exploits, exerted themſelves with ſuch activity, that, according to their own report, not a ſingle man of ſeven hundred eſcaped alive; it is certain, that none of them ever appeared to contradict this aſſertion. Beſides the eſcapes already mentioned, Captain Clive had another, which was not diſcovered until the hurry of the day was over, when it was found that the volley which the enemy fired into the Choultry where he was ſleeping, had ſhattered a box that lay under his feet, and killed a ſervant who lay cloſe to him.

MAJOR Lawrence remained three hours at the foot of the rock, in order to give them an opportunity of renewing the fight; but finding that

that they ſhewed no inclination to move towards him, he prepared to return to his camp, leaving them to take poſſeſſion of the rock again, at their peril; for ſince the loſs of the 200 Sepoys that defended it in the beginning of the action, he did not think prudent to expoſe another detachment to the ſame riſque, at ſuch a diſtance from his main body. The three guns with the priſoners, were placed in the center, and the troops marching in platoons on each ſide, the artillery was diſtributed in the front, rear, and intervals of the column. The rear had ſcarcely got clear of the rock into the plain, when the whole of the enemy's cavalry ſet up their ſhout, and came furiouſly on, flouriſhing their ſwords as if they were reſolved to exterminate at once the handful of men that oppoſed them. Whoſoever has ſeen a body of ten thouſand horſe advancing on the full gallop all together, will acknowledge with the Mareſchals Villars and Saxe, that their appearance is tremendous, be their diſcipline or courage what it will; and ſuch an onſet, would doubtleſs have diſconcerted untried ſoldiers; but the enemy had to deal with veterans, equal to any who have done honour to the Britiſh nation; men convinced by repeated experience, that a body of well diſciplined infantry, would always prevail againſt irregular cavalry, let their numbers be ever ſo great. In this confidence they halted, and without the leaſt emotion, waited for the enemy, who were ſuffered to come ſufficiently near, before the ſignal was given to the Artillery officers; the cannonade then began, from eight ſix pounders, loaded with grape, and was kept up at the rate of eight or ten ſhot in a minute, from each piece, ſo well directed, that every ſhot went amongſt the crowd, as was viſible

by the numbers that dropped: this ſoon ſtopped their career, and they ſtood awhile like men aſtoniſhed by the fall of thunder; but finding no intermiſſion of the fire, and that the battalion and Sepoys reſerved theirs with recovered arms, they went to the right about, and got out of reach as faſt as they had come on, leaving the troops to return quietly to their camp.

ON the 30th of June, the Lieutenant of Huſſars went forth with half the troop to reconnoitre, and being ſhort-ſighted led them, without ſuſpecting the danger, into covered and unequal ground, where they were ſuddenly ſurrounded by a much ſuperior number of Marattas, iſſuing from the other ſide of a hill, who immediately attacked them on all ſides. The Huſſars, as is the cuſtom of theſe troops in ſuch emergencies, endeavoured to diſperſe, and each man to ſave himſelf as he beſt could: the reſt of the troops in the camp, ſeeing the danger of their comrades, mounted and galloped to their aſſiſtance, not in a compact body, to which the others might rally, but all ſingling out different antagoniſts; in which irregular manner of combat, the Marattas themſelves are equal to any horſemen in the world. The troop of French dragoons, ſeeing the huſſars in flight, mounted and ſallied to cover their retreat, but in regular order; and the Marattas, awed by their diſcipline, quitted the fight, having killed the Lieutenant and two Huſſars, and deſperately wounded twenty-ſeven others.

IN

IN the year 1757, a body of one hundred and thirty men, was ſent from Annapolis in Nova Scotia, to procure proviſions for the garriſon, and ſome priſoners, if poſſible, for intelligence. They proceeded into the country for thirty miles; they then found the men and officers tired, the proviſions in the haver-ſacks exhauſted. Under theſe circumſtances, it was reſolved to return homewards. Our guides being examined about the ſituation of the country and roads, declared they were as great ſtrangers to theſe parts as ourſelves, and that they had never been ſo high up before. Moreover, that they knew of no road, nor would they undertake to reconduct us to our garriſon, by any other than that which we had taken. This being the caſe, and we now above thirty miles from Annapolis, there was no room for heſitation, or time to delay; ſo we reſolved to return. Three horſes were picked up in our way, and we marched about ten miles unmoleſted, which brought us to Renne Foret river, a moſt dangerous paſs, about twenty miles from the fort. Here we were ſuddenly attacked with a dreadful ſhower of ball and buck ſhot, ſeconded by as horrid a yell. This, with our commanding officer's being ſhot dead on the ſpot, and all our advanced guard, (except three or four) cut off, who had got over the bridge, threw our men into ſome confuſion, and made them fall back, repeatedly crying out, retreat to the plains. This we were compelled to ſubmit to, as they were not above an hundred yards behind our rear,

the center of which was ſtill within reach of the adjacent foreſts, if the enemy had thought proper to follow and line the ſkirts of them; but this they did not venture to do, contenting themſelves with deſtroying the advanced guard, who were under the bank below them, and ſhouting all the time, according to their cuſtom. When we had reached the plains, or more properly a tract of cleared ground, the next officer in command detached four ſubalterns with ſmall parties to the ſkirts of the woods, forming a kind of ſquare; while he, with the remainder in the center, conſulted with the guides and officers, who were volunteers, about the meaſures to be purſued in our preſent dilemma. Theſe gentlemen were not long coming to a reſolution, and it was agreed upon to force the paſs, and diſlodge the enemy: whereupon the parties were called in, the whole was drawn up in a rank entire, for hitherto we had marched two deep, and the officers took their poſts; but before we moved off, a truſty ſerjeant was ſent forward to the hollow road, to poſſeſs himſelf of every thing the deceaſed officer had about him; which he gallantly performed, regardleſs of the enemy's fire and noiſe, for they plainly perceived what he was doing, and endeavoured to make him deſiſt; but he perſevered, until he had got the captain's laced hat, watch, ſaſh, fuſil, cartouch box, piſtols, and his purſe, with near thirty guineas in it; all which he faithfully accounted for. In this ſmall ſpace of time, the officers went from right to left, animating the men; and particularly the commanding officer harangued them very coolly on the occaſion. Every thing being now adjuſted, and our ſoldiers, by the example of their officers, in good ſpirits, we

we moved forward to force the paſs. "The "enemy lay concealed to the right and left of "the road, on a prodigious ſteep hill, covered "with trees and ſpruce buſhes ſo thick, as to be "rendered almoſt impenetrable. This hill was "on the oppoſite ſide of the bridge, and a-head of "our line of march; they had a breaſt work "before them of ſtones and felled trees; at the "bottom was the river, which diſcharged itſelf "into that of Annapolis, and is between forty "and fifty feet broad: over it were thrown, by "way of bridge, two planks of timber, laid "cloſe together, both making eighteen or twenty "inches in breadth, ſo that one man only could "go over abreaſt, and there was no hand rail. "Theſe timbers were ſupported at each end, by "piers of earth and ſtones, and were elevated "about twenty feet above the water. The "ground we were on was high, and led with a "deſcent, through a hollow road, to the river "ſide, where we received the enemy's fire, and "there the marſh was flat, clear, and open. On "both ſides of the hollow way, were dark thick "woods, and the road took a turn to the right, "with a gradual riſing, and three ſteep ſteps to "the bridge; on the other ſide, the road inclined "to the left, and ran ſerpentine up the hill, with "dark foreſts on each ſide." Such was the ſituation of the defile the detachment forced their way through, in the face of a heavy fire, where a more reſolute party of fifty or ſixty men might repulſe ten times their numbers, with inconceivable loſs; and this ſhews, that, though the enemy's plan was well concerted, it was ill-ſupported; by the time that the commanding officer, volunteers and guides, with the van, had gained

the oppoſite ſide of the bridge, there was a little halt or ſtop for the ſpace of a minute; which they perceiving, called out to their companions, and huzza'd. The officer who brought up the rear, anſwered them; which encouraged our men to advance boldly and paſs the bridge, not however without farther loſs, as the enemy ſtill repeated their fire. Upon the van's marching up the hill, they ſaw the enemy ſkulking and running from the right to the left; whereupon they briſkly aſcended, followed them into the woods on the left, chaced them from their ambuſh, and gave them a cloſe fire in their flight; by this time, the whole had got up the precipice, and when they found themſelves in this ſituation, their ardour to purſue was inconceivably laudable: but the enemy were gone off, and after much fatigue we got to the fort.

ONE morning, Captain Danks, with the two Lieutenants, and ſeventy-five men, (being upon the river St. Laurence) landed, marched into the woods, and directed the ſloop to ſail up the river, cloſe to the N. E. ſhore, in order to decoy the enemy, and then attack them, which anſwered their expectations: for about twelve o'clock in the ſame day, thirty of the enemy came down to meet the ſloop, and fired upon her. The Captain, with the main body, who were within them on the ſhore, under cover of the woods, hearing their fire, inſtantly flew down with his party, and ſurrounded them, took nine priſoners, killed and ſcalped three, drove fourteen into the river, ten of whom were drowned, four ſwam acroſs

acroſs the river, and the reſt made their eſcape, under cover of a large dyke in the marſh. As ſoon as Captain Danks had ſecured his priſoners, and nineteen ſtands of arms belonging to them, he returned with his party on board the ſloop, and lay at anchor that night.

LIEUTENANT Meech, with forty rangers, landed on the iſland of Orleans without oppoſition; they went ſoon after on a ſcout, and in the woods on the north ſide of the iſland, they met a body of the inhabitants who were ſecreting their effects; the rangers ſeeing them much ſuperior in numbers, wanted to avoid them, but were puſhed ſo cloſe, as to be almoſt ſurrounded, which Mr. Meech perceiving, reſolved upon engaging, as the only reſource whereby he and his men had any probability of extricating themſelves: they accordingly ſkirmiſhed for a few minutes, when the Canadians not reliſhing ſuch treatment, even on their own ground, retired a little way; which Mr. Meech ſuſpecting to be a ſnare laid for him, inſtead of purſuing, withdrew to a farm houſe, and took poſt there, until it was clear daylight.

MAJOR ROGERS thus deſcribes a ſcout he was ſent upon: "Agreeable to orders from Lord Amherſt, I this day embarked in two whale-boats, with a party of twenty men, upon Lake George, with an intent to bring a priſoner from Ticonderoga. We paſſed the Narrows, twenty miles from our embarkation, when

Captain Shephard (who was made a captive in Auguſt laſt and carried to Canada) hailed our boat; I knew his voice, and took him on board with three other men, one of whom was taken with him. He reported, that he left Canada fifteen days before. I went on my courſe till the 27th, towards Carilon, and landed that night on the weſt ſide of the lake, concealed our boats, and travelled by land to within a mile of the Fort. I kept ſpies out the day after to improve any opportunity that might offer, and the next day ſent them ſtill nearer, but to no good purpoſe. I at length diſcovered two men, centries to the piquet guard of the French army, one of which was poſted on the road that leads from the fort to the woods: I took five of my party, and marched directly down the road in the middle of the day, till we were challenged by the centry. I anſwered in French, ſignifying that we were friends; the centinel was thereby deceived, till I came cloſe to him, when, perceiving his miſtake, in great ſurpriſe he called, *Qui etes vous?* I anſwered, Rogers, and led him forth from his poſt in great haſte, cutting his breeches and coat from him, that he might march with the greater eaſe and expedition. With this priſoner we arrived at Fort William Henry."

MAJOR ROGERS relates this ſkirmiſh, and the next as follows: "From this account of things, and knowing that thoſe who eſcaped would give early notice of us at Ticonderoga, I concluded it

it beſt to return, and ordered the party, conſiſting of ſeventy-two men, with the utmoſt expedition, to march to the fires we had kindled the night before, and prepare for a battle, if it ſhould be offered, by drawing our guns, it being a rainy day, which we effected; and then m rched in a ſingle file, myſelf and Lieutenant Kennedy in the front, Lieutenant Stark in the rear, and Captain Spikeman in the center; Enſigns Page and Rogers were between the front and center, and Enſign Brewer between the center and rear, Serjeant Walker having the command of a rear guard. In this manner we advanced half a mile, or thereabouts, over broken ground, when paſſing a valley of about fifteen rods breadth, the front having reached the ſummit of a hill on the weſt ſide of it; the enemy who had there drawn up in the form of a half-moon, with a deſign, as we ſuppoſed, to ſurround us, ſaluted us with a volley of about 200 ſhot, at the diſtance of about five yards from the neareſt or front, and thirty from the rear of their party. This fire was about two o'clock in the afternoon, and proved fatal to Lieutenant Kennedy and Mr. Gardner, a volunteer in my company, and wounded me and ſeveral others, myſelf, however, but ſlightly in the head. We immediately returned their fire. I then ordered my men to the oppoſite hill, where I ſuppoſed Lieutenant Stark and Enſign Brewer had made a ſtand with forty men to cover us, in caſe we were obliged to retreat. We were cloſely purſued, and Captain Spikeman, with ſeveral of the party, were killed, and others made priſoners. My people, however, beat them back by a briſk fire from the hill, which gave us an opportunity to aſcend, and poſt ourſelves to advantage. Af-

ter which I ordered Lieutenant Stark and Mr. Baker in the center with Enſign Rogers; Serjeant Walter and Philips, with a party, being a reſerve, to prevent our being flanked, and watch the motions of the enemy. Soon after we had thus formed ourſelves for battle, the enemy attempted to flank us on the right, but the above reſerve bravely attacked them, and giving them the firſt fire very briſkly, it ſtopped ſeveral from retreating to the main body. The enemy then puſhed us cloſely in the front, but having the advantage of the ground, and being ſheltered by large trees, we maintained a continual fire upon them, which killed ſeveral, and obliged the reſt to retire to their main body. They then attempted to flank us again, but were again met by our reſerved party, and repulſed. Mr. Baker about this time was killed. We maintained a pretty conſtant fire on both ſides, till the darkneſs prevented our ſeeing each other, and about ſun-ſet I received a ball through my hand and wriſt, which diſabled me from loading my gun. I however found means to keep my people from being intimidated by this accident; they gallantly kept their advantageous ſituation till the fire ceaſed on both ſides. The enemy, during the action, uſed many arts and ſtratagems to induce us to ſubmit, ſometimes threatening us with ſeverity if we refuſed, aſſuring us that they every moment expected a large reinforcement, which ſhould cut us to pieces without mercy; at other times flattering and cajoling us, declaring it was a pity ſo many brave men ſhould be loſt; that we ſhould, upon our ſurrender, be treated with the greateſt compaſſion and kindneſs; calling me by name, they gave me the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of their eſteem

eſteem and friendſhip that words could do; but no one being diſmayed by their menaces, or flattered by fair promiſes, we told them our numbers were ſufficient, and that we were determined to keep our ground as long as there were two left to ſtand by each other; during the night we retired."

IN this manner we marched with 180 men a mile and an half, when our advanced guard informed me of the enemy being in their view, and ſoon after, that they had aſcertained their number to be ninety-ſix, chiefly Indians. We immediately laid down our packs, and prepared for battle, ſuppoſing theſe to be the whole number or main body of the enemy, who were marching on our left up the rivulet upon the ice. I ordered Enſign Macdonald to the command of the advanced guard, which, as we faced to the left, made a flanking party to our right. We marched to within a few yards of the bank, which was higher than the ground we occupied; and obſerving the ground gradually to deſcend from the bank of the rivulet to the foot of a mountain, we extended our party along the bank, far enough to command the whole of the enemy at once; we waited till their front was nearly oppoſite to our left wing, when I fired a gun, as a ſignal for a general diſcharge upon them, whereupon we gave them the firſt fire, which killed above forty Indians; they retreated, and

were purſued by about one half of our people. I now imagined the enemy totally defeated, and ordered Enſign Macdonald to head the flying remains of them, that none might eſcape; but we ſoon found our miſtake, and that the party we had attacked were only their advanced guard, the main body coming up, conſiſting of ſix hundred more, Canadians and Indians; upon which I ordered our people to retreat to their own ground, which we gained at the expence of fifty men killed; the remainder I rallied, and drew up in pretty good order, where they fought with ſuch intrepidity and bravery, as obliged the enemy (though ſeven to one in number) to retreat a ſecond time; but we not being in a condition to purſue them, they rallied again, and recovered their ground, and warmly puſhed us in front and both wings, while the mountain defended our rear; but they were ſo warmly received, that their flanking parties ſoon retreated to their main body with conſiderable loſs. This threw the whole again into diſorder, and they retreated a third time; but our number being too far reduced to take advantage of their diſorder, they rallied again and made a freſh attack upon us. About this time we diſcovered about 200 Indians going up the mountain on our right, as we ſuppoſed, to get poſſeſſion of the riſing ground, and attack our rear; to prevent which, I ſent Lieutenant Philips, with eighteen men, to gain the firſt poſſeſſion, and beat them back; which he did, and being ſuſpicious that the enemy would go round on our left, and take poſſeſſion of the other part of the hill, I ſent Lieutenant Afton, with fifteen men, to prevent them there; ſoon after deſired two gentlemen, who were their

their volunteers in the party, with a few men, to go and ſupport him, which they did with great bravery. The enemy puſhed us ſo cloſe in front, that the parties were not more than twenty yards aſunder in general, and ſometimes intermixed with each other. The fire continued almoſt conſtant for an hour and a half from the beginning of the attack, in which time we loſt eight officers, and more than 100 private men killed on the ſpot. We were at laſt obliged to break, and I with about twenty men ran up the hill to Philips and Crafton, where we ſtopped and fired on the Indians who were eagerly puſhing us, with numbers that we could not withſtand. Lieutenant Philips being ſurrounded by 300 Indians, was at this time capitulating for himſelf and party, on the other part of the hill. He ſpoke to me, and ſaid, if the enemy would give them good quarters, he thought it beſt to ſurrender, otherwiſe he would fight while he had one man left to fire a gun. I now thought it moſt prudent to retreat, and bring off with me as many of my party as I poſſibly could, which I immediately did; the Indians cloſely purſuing us at the ſame time, took ſeveral priſoners. We came to Lake George in the evening, where we found ſeveral wounded men, whom we took with us to the place where we had left our ſleds, from whence I ſent an expreſs to Fort Edward, deſiring Mr. Haviland to ſend a party to meet us, and aſſiſt us in bringing in the wounded; with the remainder I tarried there the whole night, without fire or blankets, and in the morning we proceeded up the lake, and met with Captain Stark at Hoop iſland, ſix miles north from Fort William Henry, and encamped there that night;

the

[redacted] in the evening, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] I was at this time [redacted] to the several houses, about [redacted] which were near the fort, [redacted] all completed at the same instant of time, [redacted] having a single gun. We took in the [redacted] four soldiers, and in the houses [redacted] prisoners, women and children in- [redacted] young men made their escape to [redacted]

CAPTAIN

CAPTAIN HAZEN, and his rangers, being advanced in a houſe a little to the north-weſt of Lorette, he ſent a ſpy out for intelligence, who returned ſoon after, and acquainted his officer, that he ſaw a large party of the enemy, formed into two bodies, and filing off by two diſtinct roads; that, having narrowly watched their motions, he ſuſpected their intention might be to ſurround his poſt, and that they were not then at a great diſtance. Upon this information he left a ſerjeant and fourteen men in the houſe, and marched with the remainder to ſollicit a reinforcement of an officer and twenty privates at Lorette church; in his route he ſpied the enemy not far from them, whereupon he told his rangers, he thought they had better return to the houſe, as they could reach that poſt much ſooner than the church; but his men nobly refuſed, ſaying, "Sir, lead us on, and rely upon us: the regu-"lars have diſplayed prodigies of valour this "winter on many occaſions; we will fight and "chace the enemy as they have done, or die." Accordingly they advanced very ſpiritedly to the enemy, who were endeavouring to ſteal upon them, gave them a regular diſcharge of a brace of balls, beſides buck-ſhot, from each piece, and ſent them flying. By this time Mr. Hazen hearing ſome ſtraggling ſhots in his rear, faced his men about, who were again loaded, charged and routed in like manner a ſecond body of fifty men

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Thus elated by this wonderful deliverance, they purſued the fugitives, who they perceived were retiring towards the houſe, not ſuſpecting any people were poſted there, in order to poſſeſs themſelves of it; the Captain thereupon knowing they would be well received, moved leiſurely after them. The ſerjeant, who expected they would pay him a viſit, cooly reſerved his fire untill they came within fifteen or ſixteen yards, and then let fly at them ſo unexpectedly, that they turned tail with the greateſt precipitation; the Captain hearing the fire, advanced briſkly to ſuſtain his ſerjeant, who, ſeeing his friends approaching, ſallied out in purſuit of the runaways, and the whole company immediately puſhed after them for near two miles, and took ſome wounded men who were not able to eſcape.

IN the Campaign of 1761, when the French army under the command of Marſhal Broglio and the Prince of Soubiſe were retiring towards Hoxter, where they paſſed the Weſer, Prince Ferdinand followed cloſe after them for ſeveral days, and on the evening before they gained the paſs over the river, one of Prince Ferdinand's German aid de camps ordered the grenadiers and
ders who were in front, to puſh and take
he enemy's baggage, which was a little
e them, and but weakly guarded. They
ediately formed, and marched in a
r a plain with a thick wood in front,
which

which they were told was clear, and had got within four hundred paces of the enemy's baggage, when ſeveral ſquadrons of French dragoons ruſhed ſuddenly out upon them from the ſkirts of the wood, upon both flanks, and were hewing them down without mercy, when Cornet Nangle of Elliot's regiment, with an advanced guard of twenty men, coming up the hill got ſight of the attack, and inſtantly ruſhing on, charged the French cavalry, who ſtartled at the briſkneſs of an attack which they were not expecting, immediately reined back, when the reſt of the regiment getting in view, came on, and attacking the French, drove them off, having killed and wounded a few, and taken ſome priſoners. The determined bravery of this young officer with his twenty men, ſaved a great number of the grenadiers and Highlanders from being cut to pieces, and ſhew what may be effected by the ſudden attack of an advanced guard of cavalry.

IN the campaign of 1760, that excellent general and true genius of a partizan, the Prince of Brunſwick, was ſituated at ſome diſtance from Zerenberg, at that time in the poſſeſſion of the French; and being informed by two Hanoverian officers who had been in the town diſguiſed like peaſants, that the garriſon were very remiſs in their duty, truſting to the vicinity of their army, and the diſtance of ours. The prince was reſolved to ſurpriſe them: after appointing a corps to ſuſtain them, he advanced in the night with Major

Major M'Lean of the 88th regiment, and two hundred Highlanders, with bayonets fixed and their arms not loaded, following at a little diſtance. Upon the firſt centry's challenging, the Prince anſwered in French, and the centry ſeeing but two perſons advancing, (whom he believed to be French) he had no diſtruſt, ſo that the Major getting up to him, ſtabbed him, and prevented his giving the alarm. The Highlanders immediately ruſhed in and attacked the guard with their bayonets, and carried the town, having killed or taken the whole garriſon of eight hundred men.

IN the month of February 1761, when Prince Ferdinand beat up the quarters of the French, they were obliged to retire a great way without being able to reſiſt; however, when they came to collect their force, and to recoil upon our army, Sir William Erſkine, with the 15th regiment of light dragoons, was in a village in our front. In a very foggy morning, ſoon after the patroles reported that all was well, Sir William was alarmed by his videttes having ſeen a large body of cavalry coming to ſurpriſe him. He inſtantly mounted his horſe, and ſallied out at the head of the piquet of fifty men, leaving orders for the regiment to follow as faſt as they could mount, without beating a drum or making any noiſe. He attacked their advanced guard in the curſory manner of the light cavalry, and continued to do

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ſo while his men were joining him by tens and twenties, and the French cavalry forming to reſiſt an attack, till he collected the whole, and then retired, the ſurgeon of the regiment (Mr. Elliot) having in the mean time carried off the baggage.

POLYBIUS in his ſeventh book gives an account of an attack full of inſtruction for officers, for which reaſon the detail of the whole circumſtances ſhall be taken from that work. The blockade of Sardis by Antiochus the great, ſays he, had laſted two years, when Lygoras of Crete, a man of extenſive knowledge in war, put an end to it in the following manner: He conſidered that the ſtrongeſt places are often taken with the greateſt eaſe, from the negligence of the beſieged, who truſting to the natural or artificial fortifications of their town, are at no pains to guard. He knew likewiſe that towns are often taken at the ſtrongeſt places, from their being perſuaded that the enemy will not attempt to attack them there. Upon theſe conſiderations, though he knew that Sardis was looked on as a place that could not be taken by aſſault, and that hunger only could make them open their gates, yet he hoped to ſucceed. The greatneſs of the difficulties only encreaſed his zeal to contrive a means of carrying the town. Having perceived that a part of the wall which joined the citadel to the town was not guarded, he formed the deſign of ſurpriſing

priſing it at that place; he obſerved that this wall was built on the top of a rock which was extremely high and ſteep, at the foot of which, as into an abyſs, the people of the town threw down the carcaſſes of their dead horſes and other beaſts of burthen, at which place great numbers of vultures and other carnivorous birds aſſembled daily to feed, and after having filled themſelves, they never failed to reſt upon the top of the rock or wall, which made our Cretan imagine that this place was neglected, and without any guard upon it. On this thought, he went to the place at night, and examined with care how he could approach it, and where he ought to place his ladders. Having found a place proper for his purpoſe, he acquainted the king with his diſcovery and deſign; and the king, delighted with the project, adviſed Lagoras to purſue it, and granted him two other officers whom he aſked for, and who appeared to him to have all the neceſſary qualities for aſſiſting him in his ſcheme. The three having conſulted together, they only waited one night, at the end of which there was no moon; which being come, they choſe fifteen of the ſtouteſt and braveſt men of the army to carry the ladders, to ſcale the walls, and run the ſame riſk that they did. They likewiſe took thirty others to place in ambuſh in the ditch, and to aſſiſt thoſe who ſcaled the wall to break down a gate into which they were to enter. The king was to make two thouſand men follow them, and favour the enterpriſe by marching the reſt of the army to the oppoſite ſide of the town. Every thing being prepared for the execution, Lagoras and his people approached ſoftly with their ladders, and having ſcaled the rock, they came to the gate

gate which was near them, and having broke it, let in the two thouſand men, who cut the throats of all they met, and ſet fire to the houſes, ſo that the town was pillaged and ruined in an inſtant.

THERE are inſtances of ſurprizes ſucceeding from ſingular addreſs. Captain Brachia wanting to make himſelf maſter of a tower in the territory of Amberſa, cauſed one of his ſoldiers to diſguiſe himſelf like a woman, and gave him a baſket in his hand with a ſickle. This man ſo diſguiſed ran as faſt as he could to the tower, pretending to have fled from a party of the enemy: the guard let him enter and mount a ladder to the top of the tower, to ſhew the centry where the enemy was; but he was ſcarcely got up, when he clove the centry's head with the ſickle, ſeized his arms, and obliged thoſe who were below, to abandon the poſt.

THE Count Eaſterhaſi being detached with three hundred cavalry to levy contributions, in the environs of Straſburg, left a lieutenant with thirty men to guard the bridge at Wolfſheim; the Lieutenant from ſome motive or other quitted his poſt, when happily for the detachment, chance brought Mr. Jeney there with ten chaſſeurs, and he

he was ſcarcely arrived, when he ſaw three large parties of French huſſars, advancing to take poſſeſſion of the paſſage. He had only time to throw himſelf with his ſmall party in a hurry into a mill that ſeemed to command the bridge, and having made loop holes through the wall, he kept ſuch a conſtant and deadly fire, that he diſputed the paſſage till Count Eſterhaſi's detachment hearing the noiſe of the muſketry, came almoſt a league, ſurprized the enemy in the rear, and in five minutes took eighty horſes, and ſeveral priſoners.

HENRY de Berg having formed a plan of ſurprizing the caſtle of Wachtendonck, and knowing that Ryhoven the Governor had only a ſmall garriſon, he bribed one Peelhaſe, a fiſherman, to carry fifteen ſoldiers of the garriſon of Venlo to the town privately in his boat. They were accordingly put on board, and concealed under ſome ſtraw. When Peelhaſe came before the caſtle, he deſired the centinel, who happened to be a perſon with whom he was well acquainted, to give him his hand, and aſſiſt him in getting upon the bridge. He did ſo; but Peelhaſe drawing him into the water, ſtabbed him with his dagger. The ſoldiers inſtantly ruſhed out of the boat, killed the guard; took poſſeſſion of the caſtle; admitted a number of troops who had been drawn from the neighbouring garriſons to favour the enterprize, and raiſing the draw-bridge, hindred any people from the town to get ſucceſs.

TWO Spaniſh deſerters had lived for ſome time in the town of Sluys, and carefully obſerved its condition. They again joined their former friends, and acquainted them, that it might be eaſily ſurprized, becauſe there was no guard kept upon the bridge, called Catzand. The garriſon imagined that the town was perfectly ſafe from that quarter, where the ground was low, and where there was a number of ſmall forts, which an enemy, it was thought, could not paſs unobſerved. Upon this intelligence, Teraille was ordered to march to Sluys, while Frederick de Berg, with another detachment of troops, ſhould be ready to aſſault the caſtle, as ſoon as the town was taken. Noot, the Governor of the town and neighbouring forts, learned that the enemy intended ſome enterprize. He ſent notice to the ſeveral garriſons to be ready; but never ſuſpected that they would aſſault a town ſo ſtrong as Sluys. Teraille got to the ramparts, without cauſing any alarm. He ordered part of his men to make a falſe attack on the other ſide, with a view to draw the garriſon that way. All was ſtill quiet in the town, and Teraille entertained little doubt of ſucceſs. A very ſingular accident fruſtrated his deſign. A particular hour was fixed for making the feigned attack, but the perſon who had the charge of the town clock, having, in winding it up in the evening, put it out of order, no hour was ſtruck during the whole night. The party on the other ſide, therefore, waiting for the hour appointed, did nothing; and the other, not under-

underſtanding the reaſon of this delay, began to ſuſpect that their plan was diſcovered, and that ſome miſchief had happened. Teraille, with much difficulty, prevailed with his party to march up to the gate, and force it open. Some of the guard were killed, the reſt took to flight. The Spaniards were very unwilling to enter, dreading from the ſilence that reigned in the town and from no attack being made, as was propoſed on the other ſide, that ſome plot was laid for their deſtruction. They ventured at laſt, and had gone a conſiderable way, before they met with any reſiſtance. The preſervation of the town was chiefly owing to Slingſby, an Engliſh Captain, who collecting thirteen of his men, directly charged the enemy, making uſe at the ſame time of a ſtratagem to intimidate them. Marching on boldly, as if followed by a great number of ſoldiers, he called out aloud to his Lieutenant, to march round the enemy with his diviſion, and cut off their retreat. They no ſooner heard the orders of Slingſby, than they turned their backs, and fled in confuſion. Slingſby followed, and being joined by more of the garriſon, made a terrible ſlaughter.

WHEN Feſcamp in Normandy was taken by Biron from the league, in the garriſon that was turned out of it, there was a gentleman called Boisroſe, a man of ſenſe and courage, who making an exact obſervation of the place he left, and having concerted his ſcheme, contrived to get two

ſoldiers, whom he had bound to his intereſt, to be received into the new garriſon, which was put into Feſcamp by the royaliſts. That ſide of the fort next the ſea, is a perpendicular rock ſix hundred feet high, the bottom of which, for about the heighth of twelve feet, is continually waſhed by the ſea, except four or five days in the year, during the utmoſt receſs of the ſea, when for the ſpace of three or four hours, it leaves fifteen or twenty fathom of dry ſand, at the foot of the rock.

Bois-roſe, who found it impoſſible by any other way, to ſurprize a garriſon who guarded with great care a place lately taken, did not doubt of accompliſhing his deſign, if he could enter by that ſide, which was thought inacceſſible; this he endeavoured by the following contrivance to perform. He had agreed upon a ſignal with the two ſoldiers, whom he had corrupted. And one of them waited for it continually upon the top of the rock, where he poſted himſelf during the whole time that it was low water. Bois-roſe, taking the opportunity of a very dark night, came with fifty reſolute men, in two large boats, to the foot of the rock. He had provided himſelf with a thick cable, equal in length to the height of the rock, and tying knots at equal diſtances, run ſhort ſticks through, to ſerve to ſupport them as they climbed. The ſoldier whom he had gained, having waited ſix months for the ſignal, no ſooner perceived it, than he let down a cord from the top of the precipice, to which thoſe below faſtened the cable, by which means it was wound up to the top, and made faſt to an opening in the battlement, with a ſtrong crow run through an iron ſtaple made for that purpoſe. Bois-roſe giving the lead to two ſerjeants, whoſe courage he was

well convinced of, ordered the fifty ſoldiers to mount the ladder in the ſame manner, one after another, with their weapons tied round their bodies, himſelf bringing up the rear, to take away all hope of returning, which indeed ſoon became impoſſible, for before they had aſcended half way, the ſea riſing more than ſix feet, carried off their boats, and ſet their cable a floating; the neceſſity of withdrawing from a difficult enterprize, is not always a ſecurity againſt fear, when the danger appears moſt inevitable. If the mind repreſents to itſelf theſe fifty men, ſuſpended between heaven and earth, in the midſt of darkneſs, truſting their ſafety to a machine ſo inſecure, that the leaſt want of caution, the treachery of a mercenary ſoldier, or the ſlighteſt fear, might precipitate them into the abyſs of the ſea, or daſh them againſt the rocks; add to this, the noiſe of the waves, the height of the rock, their wearineſs and exhauſted ſpirits; it will not appear ſurpriſing, that the boldeſt amongſt them trembled, as in effect he who was foremoſt did. This ſerjeant telling the next man that he could mount no higher, and that his heart failed him. Bois-roſe, to whom this diſcourſe paſſed from mouth to mouth, and who perceived the truth of it, by their advancing no higher, crept over the bodies of thoſe that were before him, adviſing each to keep firm, and got up to the foremoſt, whoſe ſpirits he at firſt endeavoured to animate; but finding that gentleneſs would not prevail, he obliged him to mount, by pricking him in the back with his poignard; and doubtleſs if he had not obeyed him, he would have precipitated him into the ſea. At length, with incredible labour and fatigue, the whole troop got to the top of the rock, a little

before the break of day, and was introduced by the two ſoldiers into the caſtle, where they began to ſlaughter without mercy the centinels and the whole guard; ſleep delivered them up as an eaſy prey to the enemy, who killed all that reſiſted, and poſſeſſed themſelves of the fort.

THE Governor of the iſland of Lero, when attacked by the Turks, was a young knight of Malta, by name Simeoni. This young knight having no garriſon of ſoldiers, but only ſome poor inhabitants that cultivated the leaſt rocky places of the iſle, put a good face upon the matter, and fired briſkly on the infidels that battered; but as their artillery had beat down a great pannel of the wall of his caſtle, he, to intimidate the enemy, and prevent their making any aſſault, dreſſed the inhabitants of the iſland, and alſo their wives, in the habit of Knights, with the white croſs: this new militia, by his orders, lined the breach in great numbers. The Turks taking them really to be knights, and imagining that they were a reinforcement which had been ſent on the noiſe of their cannon, and landed in the iſle by night, raiſed the ſiege by precipitation for fear of being ſurpriſed by the gallies of the order, which owed the preſervation of this fort to the reſolution and addreſs of young Simeoni.

M. DE TURENNE, ſeeing that a hill, which commanded the plain where their army was, and which could open a communication with Fribourg, was not poſſeſſed by the enemy, ordered the regiments of Montauſier and Mezieres, which made a battalion of a thouſand men, to march thither, and cauſed the reſt of the foot to advance, in order to ſuſtain them. The enemy perceiving that we were marching towards the hill, ordered fifteen or twenty Muſketeers, who were upon guard on the declivity of the hill, to get up to the top of it; they got there before the two French regiments, and fired upon them as they were marching up: the French, who did not ſee the backſide of the hill, and who imagined that all the enemy's infantry were advancing up the hill, took the alarm, and marching in diſorder through very rugged places, two enſigns began to come down with their colours, and preſently the whole battalion, inſtead of going up, went along the ſide of the hill, and the enemy had time to give them a ſecond fire, upon which, the whole battalion gave ground and came down.

MR. de la Breteſche, Colonel of a regiment of Dragoons, ſurprized Loo, a Spaniſh town on the Demer; he knew the garriſon of that place was very weak, and that it was negligently guarded, both within and without; the inhabitants placing their confidence in their remoteneſs

neſs from our places, and likewiſe in the waters that ſurrounded their town. Mr. de la Breteſche regulated his project and diſpoſition by all theſe particulars, and advancing with his troops, ſurrounded the place before day appeared; entered the covert way, let down little boats of oziers into the ditch, or rather large flaſkets, covered with wax cloth, and paſt a conſiderable part of his infantry over, reſerving the reſt to fire upon the garriſon, when they ſhould oppoſe this attack. The infantry gained the other ſide of the ditch; cut the fraiſes, and mounted the baſtion. The other body of infantry likewiſe croſſed the ditch, when they ſaw thoſe who had already paſſed, maſters of the baſtion; as they were then ſtronger in the place, than the garriſon they had ſurprized, they made them priſoners.

The following example is deſcribed by M. de Feuquieirs.

I commanded, in Pignerol, that winter, and when the duke of Savoy diſpoſed his troops in winter quarters, he placed his four companies of Gensdarmes in Savigliano, where the guard was kept by the city companies and the Milice. I was well acquainted with the place, having been frequently there in the preceding campaign, and I knew that on the ſide of the gate of Carmagnole, there was a baſtion of earth, joined to the wall of the city, and near a gate which was only ſhut at night, without any guard for its ſe-

curity. The knowledge of theſe particulars, made me reſolve to ſurpriſe the Gensdarmes, who were ſo negligent in their guard. With this view, I improved the opportunity of a hard froſt, becauſe I ſhould be obliged to paſs the ditch of the baſtion; which was full of water. I likewiſe conveyed a ſpy into Savigliano, on whoſe fidelity I could depend, and who, on the night appointed for the execution of my project, drew out the nails that faſtened the lock on the wall gate, that opened to the baſtion within the city; and I marched a body of eight hundred horſe, and four hundred foot, who rode on the cruppers, with ſo much expedition, that I arrived at the baſtion, two hours before day; and when I had cauſed that baſtion, and the gate in the city wall to be ſurveyed, that I might be ſatisfied whether my ſpy had executed my orders or not; I ordered the foot to advance to the glacis of the ditch; I then formed them in order of battle, on the place, ſeized the guard at the gate, which I cauſed to be opened for the horſe, and, without the leaſt oppoſition, carried off the four companies of the Gensdarmes into Pignerol; though the Duke of Savoy, if he had either ſuſpected, or diſcovered my deſign, might have fallen upon me, with four times the number of horſe which I then had. In the execution of this enterprize, I marched above twenty-eight leagues, in the ſpace of thirty hours, and paſt and repaſt three rivers, of which the Po was one.

[QUEIRS then deſcribes the ſurprizal of ...a, by Prince Eugene. "Cremona was a place

place of arms during the war in Lombardy, and Marſhal de Villeroy had eſtabliſhed his head quarters there, in the winter ſeaſon. He there had a very great body of foot and horſe, and was likewiſe covered by a conſiderable body, commanded by the Marquis of Crequi, whoſe quarters were fixed between the Oglio and the Po, over which we had a bridge, before Cremona, the head of which, on the ſide of the Modeneze, and the Parmeſan, was covered with a work guarded by the garriſon of Cremona, for its ſecurity againſt a body of Imperialiſts, who wintered in the Modeneze. Prince Eugene, with the remainder of the Emperor's army, poſſeſſed the quarters between the Oglio, the Adda, and the Mincio. From this general diſpoſition, Prince Eugene formed a deſign to carry Cremona by ſurprize. He maintained an intelligence within the place, by which he was informed, that even the preſence of the commander in chief, with ſeveral general officers, and the ſtrong garriſon, had not rendered the ſervice more regular, nor cauſed the guard to be kept with greater ſtrictneſs; but that it was entirely neglected, both within the place and without. No care was taken to poſt any troops without the place, in the night; the rounds were not made on the ramparts within, nor was any patrol of horſe and foot ordered through the ſtreets. It was thought ſufficient to ſtation a guard at the gates, and upon the works, but the troops who compoſed this guard, had not any communication with each other in the night by rounds, nor were any centinels ſo much as poſted on the ramparts, over the gates, to obſerve if any approaches were made. In a word, there was a general inattention, in Cremona, to the

ſervice neceſſary in all ſuch places. A prieſt who officiated at a little church, ſomething remote from the public part of the town, had his houſe near that church, and an aqueduct, which conveyed the water, from the ſtreets, into ditches, was contiguous to the cellar of his houſe. Cremona has a conſiderable number of theſe conveyances, but not one of them was grated. The prieſt cauſed prince Eugene to be made acquainted with this particular, and he prepared for his enterprize, upon that information. He introduced into Cremona by theſe aqueducts, about ſix hundred men who were concealed, by the prieſt, in his cellar, and likewiſe in his church, which was not daily frequented. He likewiſe introduced in the day time, a conſiderable number of ſoldiers, diſguiſed like peaſants, and who did not quit the city at night, but were received by the prieſt, or ſome others of the conſpirators. This expedient was very practicable, becauſe there was not any guard at the gates, and no enquiries were made, whether thoſe who entered the town in the day, had either quitted it, or continued in the place; part of the men were furniſhed with inſtruments for breaking locks, and with other implements proper for the demolition of ſtone-work. Two of the city gates towards the Oglio, were choſen by prince Eugene, for the introduction of the main body of his troops. One of theſe gates, namely, that which was neareſt to the prieſt's houſe, had been walled up, and upon the rampart over that gate, was a ſmall corps de guard, where only eight or ten men were poſted, who by the remiſsneſs in the ſervice of the rounds, had not any centinel before the gate of the corps de guard. The enemy having, without any noiſe, ſeized

ſeized the men who were ſleeping in the corps de guard, cauſed their workmen to pull down the wall that cloſed up the gate, without any danger of being diſcovered by the rounds, becauſe they were entirely neglected. The other gate, which, in the day time, opened the communication between the country and the city, had a corps de guard below, and the guard of this gate was more numerous, but without any attention for the centinels, becauſe there were no rounds for the officer to anſwer. There was not any portcullis, and conſequently not any centinel above, to let it down at any exigencies; neither was there any poſt without the gate, nor ſo much as a centinel upon it, to obſerve what approaches were made from the high road. Marſhal de Villeroy, who had taken a progreſs, to viſit the quarters on the upper Oglio, was on his return by Milan, where he received intelligence that prince Eugene was forming ſeveral motions, in thoſe quarters of his, that were moſt remote from the Oglio. This induced him to return to Cremona, the night before the ſurprizal; not that he had any ſuſpicion that thoſe motions of the enemy could be intended againſt Cremona, but rather that they had for their object the quarters which the Marquis de Crequi poſſeſſed along the lower Oglio, and in which Marſhal de Villeroy had ordered him to be very vigilant, becauſe prince Eugene was maſter of the poſt of Veſtiano, on the Oglio, oppoſite to Cremona. The Marquis de Crequi had likewiſe, in his turn, ſent intelligence to Marſhal de Vileroy, that all the quarters of prince Eugene were in motion, and that he had been aſſured, by ſeveral ſpies, that he was forming ſome deſign againſt Cremona. When the hour for executing

this enterprize at laſt arrived; Prince Eugene paſt the Oglio, at Veſtiano, about ſixteen leagues from Cremona; but neither Marſhal de Villeroy, nor any of our generals, had advice of that motion, ſo univerſal was the inattention to the parts without, as I have already intimated, and which, in this conjuncture, was inexcuſable; for as it was generally known, that all the quarters of the enemy, on the other ſide of the Oglio, were in motion, we ought, at leaſt, to have had parties of horſe on Uſtiano, (which was the only bridge poſſeſſed by the enemy on the Oglio,) in order to be informed whether Prince Eugene had paſt that river. But this conſiderable attention being neglected, that prince advanced before the gates of Cremona, with a body of horſe and foot, compoſed of 7000 men, without our receiving any intelligence of his march. The men who were either introduced by the aqueduct, or had entered the town in the diſguiſe of peaſants, and had been concealed in the prieſt's houſe, and other places, ſeized, without the leaſt noiſe, the corps de guard, at the gate that afforded the paſſage into the place, and which they opened to a column of horſe and foot, who advanced to the great ſquare, where a guard of foot, and another of horſe, were poſted, and who were as remiſs in the ſervice, as thoſe at the gate which had been ſurprized, and they conſequently were all made priſoners, without creating any alarm: the enemy's troops of the ſecond column, who had been conducted to the gate that was walled up, were introduced by a party of men who had been concealed in the prieſt's houſe, and had ſeized the little corps de guard at the gate, after which they demoliſhed the wall that cloſed it up, and ranged

the materials in ſuch a manner, as to open a commodious paſſage to the infantry, who were to be admitted at that gate. Theſe forces, upon their introduction, were to march according to the orders they had received, along the ramparts, to the left, in order to ſeize the gate of the Po, and the guard who were poſted there, after which, they were to open that gate for the admiſſion of another body of troops, who were at the end of the bridge on the ſide of the Modeneze, and had been ordered not to attack the guard, who were poſted in the work that covered the bridge, till they had received a ſignal from the gate of the Po, after it had been ſurprized. Thus have we ſeen 7000 of the enemy's forces, introduced into the middle of a fortified city, where they made themſelves maſters of two gates, formed the horſe in order of battle, in ſeveral parts of the place, and expatiated where-ever they pleaſed; in all which time, not one of our men awakened, neither did we receive the leaſt alarm. And yet an accident which it was impoſſible for prince Eugene to foreſee, defeated this project which had been ſo well planned, and was ſo happily conducted to the moment of the intended execution. The Marquis de Crenaw, director of the infantry, having accompanied M. de Villeroy to Cremona, from Milan, had an inclination to review part of the infantry that morning, and had ordered the battalions who were poſted near the gate of the Po, to be under arms, a little before day, that he might review them, as ſoon as it grew light. When the nights are long, it is eaſy for perſons to be deceived in the hour when day approaches. Theſe battalions, therefore, were all under arms, at the gate of the Po, ſooner than their appointed

time; and when the enemy's troops, who advanced along the rampart, to ſurprize that gate, diſcovered thoſe battalions under arms, they imagined their enterprize was diſcovered, and began to attack our men, who not knowing by whom they were aſſaulted, in that manner, diſcharged ſeveral vollies, and ſoon diſcovered them to be enemies, which occaſioned an engagement that awaked all our troops. The battalions that were to be reviewed by M. de Crenaw, after the others, and were lodged at a great diſtance from them, began to be in motion in their barracks, and were ſoon ready. A party of horſe likewiſe, who had been ordered, the day before, by Marſhal de Villeroy, to advance towards the Plaiſantine, were ready to mount. All theſe troops marched to the enemy, who were formed in battle, in the ſeveral parts of the town, and had even poſſeſſed the avenues, in a full perſuaſion that it would be impoſſible for our troops to reſiſt them; and eſpecially as they had taken not only Marſhal de Villeroy, who had mounted his horſe, at the firſt alarm, but likewiſe the commiſſary of the muſters, and a great number of other officers, who were undoubtedly betrayed by the perſons at whoſe houſes they lodged. M. de Crenaw, when he quitted his apartment, that morning, had been ſo fortunate as to place himſelf at the head of ſome infantry, whom he marched to the little ſquare, and diſlodged the enemy, who retired, from that ſituation, to their main body, in the great ſquare; and this motion facilitated the conjunction of the king's troops, who were poſted in the remote arters. The engagement was carried on, ugh all parts of the city, by the mere bra- and good diſpoſition of the troops, and inferior

ferior officers, for Marſhal de Villeroy was taken priſoner, as I have already obſerved, and M. de Crenaw had been mortally wounded in the attack he cauſed to be made. Two Colonels, likewiſe, of thoſe regiments who were under arms, at the gate of the Po, were killed; and yet the death of two of the enemies officers obliged Prince Eugene to abandon his enterprize, and quit the town, after he had, for ſeveral hours, imagined himſelf to be maſter of it. The enemy's general officer, who conducted the column that entered by the gate of the Po, to order the troops who had advanced from the Modeneze, to attack the work that covered the bridge, was the only perſon to whom this order had been imparted, and had received fuſees to give the ſignal: but this officer having been killed, by the fire from the battalions, who were accidentally under arms, at the gate of the Po, before he could communicate to any other officer the ſecret, with which he was charged, the ſignal was not made, nor was the bridge attacked at the appointed time, to enable the Modeneze troops, when they had paſt the Po, to take a circuit on the outſide of the town, in order to enter it, at leaſt, by one of the two gates the enemy had poſſeſſed, provided they could not be introduced by the gate of the Po, which the enemies were never able to maſter. The general officer who commanded the troops appointed to attack the work that covered the bridge, and who alone was acquainted with the ſecret of the enterprize, having loſt his legs by a cannon ſhot from the work, was no longer capable of iſſuing any orders, by which means we had ſufficient time to recover the bridge. Prince Eugene's troops, in the city, were likewiſe greatly diminiſhed by the

the loſs they had ſuſtained in the long engagement, and he had reaſon to be apprehenſive, that the Marquis de Crequi, when he ſhould be informed of what paſt at Cremona, would immediately advance with his troops, and prevent the retreat of the Imperialiſts from that city. The Prince therefore thought it adviſeable to withdraw from that place, while he had an opportunity; and he accordingly drew off his troops from the center of the city, towards the two gates which he ſtill poſſeſſed, but could not accompliſh that motion, without loſing the greateſt part of his infantry, and a conſiderable number of his cavalry. However he carried off Marſhal de Villeroy, the commiſſary of the muſters, and ſeveral other officers, whom he had taken priſoners when the ſurpriſal firſt began."

THIS example is told by Feuqueir, and was executed by him: "In the year 1688, after Philipſburg was taken, I was ordered to Hailbron, with a body of troops, to command on the Necker, and to raiſe contributions in Franconia and Suabia, between the Mein, the Regnitz, and the Danube; moſt of the troops of thoſe two circles were in Hungary, where they ſerved the Emperor; but there was a ſufficient number in the country, to prevent us from making any conſiderable penetrations. And yet I marched with 800 foot, and 900 horſe, to Kreilſheim, a little town in Anſpach, where I found two battalions of

of the circle of Franconia. I was unable to force this place, which was ſurrounded with a wall, and likewiſe ſtrengthened by a good caſtle; but the colonel who commanded thoſe battalions was ſo indiſcreet as to come out of the place, to ſpeak to me, without firſt obtaining my promiſe for his return; I cauſed him to be detained, and obliged the garriſon to ſurrender themſelves priſoners of war."

THIS is likewiſe taken from Feuqueir, and the three following examples: "Newbourg is three leagues from Phortzheim, and ſeated in the valley of Entz, on the bank of that river. The city is encompaſſed with a good wall, well ſecured from a ſcalade; and there is a caſtle within the city. It has likewiſe two gates, one towards Phortzheim, the other in an oppoſite ſituation, on the bank of the river, which communicates with the other ſide, by a covered bridge. The enemy had thrown 500 foot, and 150 dragoons into the place, and this garriſon was well precautioned for its defence, on the ſide of Phortzheim, but expoſed a little too much towards the other gate, from whence they imagined they had no danger to apprehend, becauſe the ways to it were difficult to be paſt; and during the day time they poſted on an eminence that commanded a view of the gate of Phortzheim, a party of 20 dragoons, ſo that they could diſcover every man who ſhould happen to quit Phortzheim by day. The gate of Newbourg, which

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was towards the Entz, and contiguous to the covered bridge, was unprovided with a draw-bridge, and had not any work to protect it. There was only one centinel over the gate, and a corps de guard of 15 or 20 men below. The rounds, however, were frequently made on the wall. When I had gained a full information of the manner in which theſe incommodious neighbours conducted themſelves in the regulation of their guard, I made the neceſſary diſpoſitions for carrying this poſt, by the gate of Entz, becauſe the garriſon was leaſt attentive to that quarter. I waited till the cloſe of the day, that the party of dragoons might not diſcover my march; after which, I advanced with 600 men, through by-ways, which conducted me to the head of the bridge of the Entz. A prodigious quantity of ſnow had fallen, but my march was ſo ſecret and expeditious, that I arrived about midnight at the covered bridge. I then advanced upon it with my detachment, and when I was diſcovered by the centinel, who was ſtationed over the gate, I told him in high Dutch, that I belonged to a regiment which I knew was quartered in Wirtemberg, and had lately returned from the war that was carried on towards Fort Lewis, and I deſired to be admitted, as being incapable of ſuſtaining the cold any longer. The officer of the guard having received information of theſe particulars from his centinel, aſcended to the place where he was ſtationed, and converſed with me, while he diſpatched a meſſenger to the Commandant, who lodged in the caſtle at a conſiderable diſtance from that guard. During our converſation my men fixed a petard on the gate, which was not perceived by the officer, till it

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was ready to operate. He then ordered the centinel to fire, and cauſed a drum to beat an alarm, though too late; for the gate was forced in a moment, and I formed my troops in order of battle, on the ſpot, before the garriſon was in any ſtate of defence, ſo that all the troops who compoſed it were cut in pieces, in retaliation for the murder of a Lieutenant and 20 troopers of the regiment of Villeroy, by the Imperialiſts, after they had taken them priſoners, and promiſed to allow them quarter. We found 300 horſes in the town, and diſtributed them among the troopers and dragoons of the garriſon of Phortzheim; after which I ordered the town to be ſet on fire, to prevent the enemy from fixing any future poſt in that ſituation.

AS to the poſt of Entzwahingen on the Entz, below Phortzheim, which is a little town, ſituated in an open country, its garriſon was compoſed of 500 horſe, and 150 foot; and, in imitation of the garriſon of Newbourg, had a poſt in the day time on an eminence near Phortzheim, from whence the ſoldiers who were ſtationed there had a view of all thoſe who ſhould happen to come out of the town. After I had remounted all my cavalry and dragoons on the horſes taken at Newbourg, I marched to Entzwahingen, during the next night. The cavalry were ordered to advance, on the other ſide of the Entz, to prevent thoſe of the enemy from ſaving themſelves, by

by paſſing that river, while I attacked the two gates with my infantry; and I marched with 600 foot, divided into two bodies, in order to form an attack, at the ſame time, on the two gates, one of which was towards Phortzheim, and the other towards Hailbron. Theſe gates were unprovided with draw-bridges, and were not ſo well as thoſe of Newbourg. They, however, were covered with a palliſaded redan, capable of containing about fifteen men, who retired at night into the town, and in the day-time it only protected the guard who were poſted at the gate. As the enemy had no more than 150 foot in the place, I judged that the guard at the gates would be weak, and that it would be neceſſary to attack thoſe gates with vigour. I ordered hatchets to be delivered to the men who were detached for that particular ſervice, and as they were protected by the fire of the infantry, they ſoon cut down the barriers and the gates ſo effectually, that the troops entered in good order, notwithſtanding the darkneſs of the night. All the troops of the garriſon were cut to pieces, to retaliate the maſſacre I have already mentioned.

AT the cloſe of the year 1690, the Duke of Savoy having poſted a company of his regiment of guards in the caſtle of Orbaſſan, which is a league from Turin, to cover the walk he had appropriated to his uſe in the city, and likewiſe that which belonged to his palace of the Valentine; this company, though within ſight of Turin,

rin, and ſupported by the horſe who were in garriſon in this city, and in Montcalier, was ſurpriſed by my troops. I petarded the gate, though I was diſcovered, notwithſtanding the number of the enemies, and the ſignals they made to give notice of the attack they ſuſtained. I ſhall now relate the diſpoſitions I formed to ſurpriſe this poſt, and ſecure my troops during the expedition, and in their return from the execution: I marched from Pignerol, at the beginning of the night, with 800 horſe and 600 foot, from the former of which I detached 50 troopers, with orders to advance to the bank of the Po, oppoſite to Montcalier, that I might receive proper intelligence from them, in caſe the cavalry of that quarter ſhould mount, in order to attack me in my retreat; and when I approached Orbaſſan, I diſpatched the reſt of my cavalry, to form themſelves in order of battle as near Turin as poſſible, that they might oppoſe the troops who ſhould happen to march from that place in the night, to ſecure the poſt. I continued with my infantry, whom I ſtationed as ſilently as poſſible near the caſtle, in order to ſupport the petardeer, and to force their way into the caſtle, when the petard had accompliſhed its effect. The petardeer having been killed by a centinel who was at a window near the gate, and the garriſon being awaked by the report of the piece, made a great fire and ſeveral ſignals, and therefore no time was to be loſt in the execution of this enterpriſe conſiſtent with the ſecurity of my troops in their return. I was therefore obliged to fix the Petard myſelf, ſince I could not find any one who underſtood the proper management of that engine; and the entire company being forced in

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the firſt court, would not expoſe themſelves to the ſame event in the main court, but ſurrender priſoners of war."

THE city of Lucern had been burnt at the beginning of the preceding campaign, and its walls demoliſhed. The ruins, therefore, formed a kind of intrenchment around the habitations that were deſtroyed, and the troops of the battalion in garriſon there, imagined that in a ſeaſon ſo rigorous among the Alps as the month of January, they ſhould be in a condition to maintain themſelves amidſt theſe ſcattered fragments, provided they kept a vigilant guard, and continued each night under arms, notwithſtanding the cold; at the ſame time cauſing the rounds to be continually made, in order to be attentive to the noiſe of any motion of troops without Pignerol. When I had been informed of all the precautions obſerved by this battalion, I took a large circuit in order to ſurpriſe it, and arrived between the foot of the mountain and Lucern, one hour after midnight, and waited in a profound ſilence till the vigilance of the rounds was in ſome meaſure relaxed, as it appeared to be ſo in the ſpace of two hours; I advanced by ſix different tracts to this diſorderly intrenchment, which was ſoon forced, and the whole battalion deſtroyed. Lucern was almoſt inacceſſible at three quarters, or at leaſt, it was only practicable to arrive at it by paths juſt wide enough to contain two in front, and upon which were ſeveral guarded intrenchments.

ments. In order therefore to ſucceed in the ſurpriſal and deſtruction of this battalion, who had not ſufficient time to make a retreat to the mountain, the foot of which was not more than two hundred paces diſtant from the city; the knowledge, therefore, which I obtained of the ſituation of this poſt, and the manner in which it was guarded, enabled me to regulate my diſpoſition, as well as my march and attack, which was made between the mountain and the city, at a quarter from whence the enemy did not expect any invaſion.

M. de MIREPOIX, General of the French army, in the abſence of Mariſchal Beliſle, receiving advice that ſome Piedmonteſe peaſants had penetrated into this country, with a deſign to carry off ſome of our quarters; this general gave orders to all officers who commanded the quarters to be alert, and to ſend detachments to drive them back. The ſame day a ſpy of M. de Mirepoix came to my poſt, and told my poſt, that two companies of one hundred men each, who were marching towards Berra, would arrive there before midnight. On ſo exact advice, I ordered, by means of the magiſtrate, thirty peaſants, who broke loop holes in the walls of the chateau, wherever I directed them, and raiſed a good parapet of dry ſtones at the opening of the court-yard, where the enemy might have entered by (ladders, or) eſcalade. Then I made them throw ſeveral trees, with their branches on, before

fore this parapet; and ſending for the magiſtrate and his eldeſt ſon, a lad of about fourteen years old, I told the father, that being informed by the orders I had received, that the enemy, who were marching towards my poſt, held intelligence with the inhabitants of the village, in order to carry me off, I would keep his ſon with me to fix him on the top of the parapet; and that the firſt ſhot the enemy fired ſhould beat him. Having taken theſe precautions, I ſent the father back, and held myſelf ready to receive the Barbetts; who hearing that we had parties abroad to attack them, fell back to Tende.

DURING the war in Spain in 1674, Marſhal Schomberg, who commanded the French army, having a mind to cover Rouſillon, ordered a conſiderable detachment to march, to ſecure the convoys that were coming from Perpignan to the village of St. John de Payes, about three leagues from Perpignan. This corps was poſted on a height which was near the high road, from whence the commanding officer ſent his lieutenant and thirty men to take poſſeſſion of a chapel that was on an eminence ſtill higher, at about three hundred paces from his poſt; from which eminence the lieutenant could eaſily diſcover the Spaniſh encampment on the plain of Boulou, and over which their parties muſt paſs to attempt our convoys. From Boulou to theſe two poſts there was a long hollow way, through which the enemy might march under cover; and as ſurpriſes

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were to be feared every day, there was a detachment poſted alſo in a cottage called the Redhouſe, with orders to light fires to give notice to the other guards, if they made any diſcoveries, and to be always ready to help one another. A Spaniſh officer with forty horſe, paſſing the hollow way, under favour of the night, and being well acquainted with the country, and the poſition of the guard, lay in ambuſh in the middle of the three poſts, with a deſign to ſurpriſe the lieutenant's detachment, who went every morning to relieve the guard of the chapel. This lieutenant having got into the hollow way, through which he was neceſſarily to paſs, the enemy fell upon him, and charged him ſo roughly, that all his men were either killed or wounded before he had time to recollect himſelf. He received, for his own part, two cuts of a broad ſword on the head, from the Spaniſh officer, who added to this treatment theſe inſulting words, "Go, ſays he, learn another time to do your duty better, and to reconnoitre a place where you are to paſs with your guard."

DURING the Corſican war in 1737 and 1738, the king ſent reinforcements to the iſland, to reduce the malecontents to reaſon. A convoy, eſcorted by a frigate and two armed barks, appeared in the beginning of 1739, ſteering towards San Fiorenzo; but they met with a dreadful ſtorm the 8th of January, which diſperſed them; nevertheleſs, all the veſſels of this convoy arrived with

with four French battalions, at the different ports of the iſland, except two Tartanes, which had the misfortune to run on ſhore the ſame day, on the coaſt of the province of Balagna, to the left of the river Oſtregone. M. de Buivrigny, who commanded ſix companies of the regiment of Cambreſis, which were embarked in theſe Tartanes, ſaved himſelf and the troops by his preſence of mind and reſolution. It was ten o'clock at night, when the Tartane that this officer was on board of, ſtruck againſt the rocks with a dreadful ſhock, about one hundred paces from the coaſt: he hindred his people from leaping into the ſea, where they muſt inevitably have periſhed; and with a piſtol in his hand, he compelled the ſailors to launch their boat, and did not ſave himſelf, till after embarking ſucceſſively all the ſailors and ſoldiers, which took up above two hours. He had no ſooner got on ſhore with his three companies, than he had intelligence brought him, with advice to think of his ſafety; for if he ſtayed till day-light, he run a riſk of being attacked by the Corſicans; but he would not abandon the three companies that were in the other Tartane, which was alſo ſtranded on a ſandbank, at a little diſtance from the firſt; the boat of which was loſt in carrying ſome of the officers and ſoldiers on ſhore, whoſe bodies M. de Buivrigny knew on the ſtrand. He determined to aſſiſt thoſe that were ſtill in the veſſel, and made his men go into ſome cottages to warm and reſt themſelves for the remainder of the night. At day-break he ſent the boat to land his comrades, who brought on ſhore about ſixty firelocks, and a hundred and ſixty charges of ammunition; half the muſkets were without locks, being

being taken off to prevent accidents on board. M. de Buivrigny having reviewed his men, who amounted to one hundred and forty only, poſted the ſoldiers, without arms, in the middle; on the flanks thoſe who had muſkets, without locks, but with bayonets fixed; and in the front and rear, thoſe who had pieces in order. After this prudent diſpoſition, he ſet out for San Fiorenzo, from which he was about five leagues diſtant; but he ſoon had the Corſicans at his heels, who had heard of the ſhips wrecked on their coaſt. M. de Buivrigny croſſed the river d'Oſtrigone, in their ſight, having the water up to his middle, and continued his route by a mountain in ſpight of their ſhot, which he anſwered now and then. He killed a good many of the Corſicans, and had ſome of his own men wounded; but in ſpight of the good care he took of his ammunition, it was ſpent, ſo that he had but five cartridges remaining among the whole party; and had hardly got half way, when a great body of Corſicans appeared, of horſe and foot, preparing to ſurround him, and to put all to the ſword; night approaching, his men overcome with fatigue, without guides and without ammunition, ſeeing no other remedy, he determined to ſurrender himſelf priſoner. The French general greatly commended the bravery of this officer, who being reclaimed in the King's name, was immediately ſet at liberty with all his men.

AT a league from a fortreſs on the road to Coliouvre, there was a chapel dedicated to the Virgin; this chapel was built in the middle of many rocks, whoſe points almoſt inacceſſible, ſerved it for a wall, ſo that it was very ſtrong, as well by ſituation, as from the rocks being proof againſt cannon ſhot. Marſhal Schomberg, being reſolved to make himſelf maſter of this important poſt, which was defended by a Spaniſh captain and fifty Germans, detached a large body from the army, commanded by M. de Gaſſion, Marſhal de Camp; the trenches were opened, ſome cannon were drawn thither by men, and a battery was erected on a rock near the poſt; but it had little effect, though it was well ſerved. The Captain and his ſoldiers laughed at the beſiegers for five days, and ſeemed likely to be in the ſame condition for a long time to come; but a cannon ſhot having killed three Germans, who were looking over the wall, all the reſt loſt their courage, and told their captain in an inſolent manner to ſubmit, and make his compoſition, or they would do it for him; he was aſtoniſhed at their cowardice, remonſtrated to them their duty, but in vain; they hung out the white flag. The French, delighted with their diſobedience, conſented to treat with them; but while the Germans were all in confuſion the French got poſſeſſion of the chapel gate, before any conditions could be drawn up, and they were all made priſoners.

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THE governor of Fribourg, having formed a deſign againſt Briſac, ſet out at night on the 9th or 10th of that month, with two thouſand men, a great many waggons; ſome of which were loaded with arms, grenades, firelocks and pitch, and the others with choſen ſoldiers. All theſe waggons were conducted by officers diſguiſed like waggoners, and were covered with poles, with hay over them; ſo that they ſeemed to be only loaded with contribution hay. In this manner, and being favoured by a thick fog, they arrived at eight o'clock in the morning, at the new gate. Two of the waggons with men, and one with arms, got into the town immediately; but an Iriſhman, overſeer for the undertakers of the fortifications, ſeeing thirty men near the gate, who had not the appearance of peaſants, though they had the dreſs, aſked them who they were? and why they did not go to work like others? Upon their not anſwering, or appearing confounded, he ſtruck ſome of them with his cane; upon which the diſguiſed officers ſeized the arms that were in the waggon next them, and fired fifteen or twenty ſhots at him, within five or ſix paces diſtance, without wounding him; he threw himſelf into the ditch immediately, where they fired ſeveral ſhot more at him, to no purpoſe, while he cried out loudly, To arms. At this noiſe the advanced guard of the half moon, and that of the gate, took arms, and tried to haul up the bridges; but they could not, on account of the waggons that the enemy had ſtopped on them. The officers

and ſoldiers, who were in the waggons, leaped down, and took to arms; and joining to the reſt, attacked the guard, commanded by a Captain of Grenadiers, but they were repulſed; and five being killed, the reſt were diſheartened, and fled, ſome into the town, and ſome out; then he ſhut the firſt gate, through which, being of palliſadoes or rails, the enemy who were on the bridge fired at every thing that appeared. The Captain left there one half of his guard, and mounting the ramparts with the reſt, kept a continual fire on the enemy. A Lieutenant who commanded twelve men in an advanced guard, was attacked at the ſame time, by an officer who clapt a piſtol to his breaſt; but he wrenched it out of his hand, and ſhot him dead. This Lieutenant defended himſelf till the end of the action; but having received many wounds, he died the ſame day. On the noiſe of this ſurprize, M. de Raouſſet, commandant of the place, diſtributed the garriſon in all the neceſſary poſts, and did every thing that might be expected from a good and experienced officer. In fine, the enemy ſeeing their deſign fail, retired in diſorder, leaving behind them a great many waggons, and above forty ſoldiers, who were either killed or wounded. Such was the enterprize on Briſſac, which only failed by an effect of mere chance.

DURING the troubles in the iſland of Corſica, in 1739, M. Vedel being detached to Chiſoni, a village in that iſland, the parſon of the pariſh

aſked the officer commanding in the open country, to permit the penitents of a neighbouring convent to come to this village, according, as he ſaid, to their annual cuſtom, of making a proceſſion to a certain chapel in the place, which he named. The commandant conſented, but M. Vedel, who was detached thither with fifty men of his regiment, being ſurprized to ſee ſo numerous a proceſſion coming into the village, which was compoſed only of the peaſants of a revolted country, called to arms, drew up his men, and thus diſconcerted their projects; in fact, many of theſe penitents, whom they ſeized, were found to be armed with piſtols and ſwords; an account whereof being ſent to Marſhal Mallebois, the general of the French troops in Corſica, he commended the activity of M. Vedel, and ordered ſome of the penitents, parſon and all, to be hanged on the ſpot.

THE ſurprize of Amiens in Picardy, in 1597, will ever be remembered. The Spaniards having formed a deſign to ſurprize this town, laid ſome ſoldiers, diſguiſed like peaſants, in ambuſh in a houſe near the gate, and ſent forward a waggon loaded with walnuts, of which the driver ſpilt a ſack, as if by accident, and whilſt the ſoldiers of the guard ran crowding to gather them up, the diſguiſed Spaniards fell on them ſword in hand, ſurprized the gate, and made themſelves maſters of the town, which coſt Henry IV. ſix months and a half ſiege.

DURING the ſiege of Charleroy, at the end of July 1746, M. de Lautrec, then Lieutenant general of the trenches, perceiving that the taking the redoubt of Marcinelle, which defends the lower town, was abſolutely neceſſary to ſtreighten the garriſon, he ordered M. de Roche Fermoy, a brave and determined officer, to take a cloſe view of this important poſt. This officer accepted the commiſſion, ſet out with a ſingle man at the beginning of the night, paſſed between the enemies centries, and advanced even upon the glacis of the redoubt. Having ſounded the water, which ſeemed very deep, he found in one place five or ſix feet, and in another only four; he alſo ſaw the poſt was fraiſed and palliſadoed, and defended by ſeveral pieces of cannon, and fifty Auſtrians commanded by three officers. All theſe obſtacles were not ſufficient to diſhearten him; he tied his cockade to ſome reeds oppoſite to the place where the water was but four feet in the ditch, and in his way back, left his coat at ſome diſtance from that, to be a guide to him on his return to attack the poſt. When he came back to the trenches, he reported his diſcoveries to M. de Lautrec, who gave him forty choſen men, and ordered him to be ſupported by Monſieur de la Merliere, captain of grenadiers, who having marched to the oppoſite ſide of the redoubt, and drawing the fire of the garriſon that way, favoured this enterprize. As ſoon as M. de Roche Fermoy got near the glacis, he made all his men lie down cloſe, to wait the ſignal, which was made an hour before

day. Then this officer leaped into the ditch, ordering his men to put their cartridge boxes upon their heads, to preſerve them from wet, made them cut away with their hatchets as many of the fraiſes as were neceſſary to open a paſſage, climbed up the redoubt, and fell on the enemy, with fixed bayonets, who being ſurprized at ſo ſudden a viſit, ſought their ſafety by flight; but M. de Roche Fermoy, having ordered the drawbridge that communicated with the town to be hoiſted up, they were obliged to ſurrender at diſcretion.

CAPTAIN Martin and du Rolet, governor of Pont-d'Arche, having formed a deſign on Louviers in Normandy, 1591, ſurprized that town by means of a corporal, a prieſt, and a tradeſman. The prieſt took upon him to keep watch in the belfry, and to let the troops advance as near the town as they pleaſed, without ringing the alarm, and the two others promiſed to deliver up the gate. Theſe meaſures being taken, Du Rolet ſent forward ſeven reſolute ſoldiers with black ſcarfs, which were always worn by thoſe of the league; theſe ſtopped under the gate of the town, where the corporal and the tradeſman talked with them as with people of the union. Du Rolet being informed by the tradeſman, that it was time to fall on, came out of his ambuſh, ran to the gate, took poſſeſſion, cut the guard in pieces, entered the town, and immediately became maſter of it, with the aſſiſtance of new troops brought to ſuſtain him by the Baron de Biron.

IN the late war, in the year 1759, a detachment conſiſting of fifty men, commanded by a Captain and two Lieutenants, was ſent from the garriſon of Senegal in Africa down the river Senegal, with orders to encamp on the beach near the bar, under the protection of an armed ſloop, and to wait there till the troops newly arrived from Europe as a reinforcement to the garriſon, had all got over the bar. But although they were encamped in the neighbourhood of a populous village, yet the centries were ſo negligent as to fall aſleep, which the Moors took advantage of, for they ſurprized the camp in the night time, killed many of the men before they could get their firelocks out of the bells of arms, and the reſt, ſome with arms, ſome without, fled as faſt as they could to their boats, by means of which, ſuch as were not killed in the ſurprize or purſuit got back to the fort; but in the whole, the Captain, one of the Lieutenants, and twenty men, were killed, and of thoſe that eſcaped many were wounded.

DURING the wars of Germany, Guſtavus, king of Sweden, ſent Captain Meltke, a man of courage and addreſs, to reconnoitre Malchan; a very ſtrong place, and garriſoned by two hundred Cuiraſſiers. He arrived before the place in the evening, collecting as he went along all the peaſants he could, whom he ordered to light as many fires, as poſſible, round the town; he then ſent a trumpet, who ſummoned them to an immediate ſurrender,

ſurrender, as priſoners of war; informing them at the ſame time, that, if they heſitated in the leaſt, they muſt expect no quarter; for he came from the king, who was there in perſon, with his army: as they might perceive, from the numerous fires over the country. The garriſon being intimidated, laid down their arms, and marched out as priſoners of war. Captain Meltke, and his party of thirty-ſix men, directly ſurrounded them, and conducted them to the Swediſh army, then encamped thirty miles diſtant from Malchan.—

DURING the war, between the Emperor and Francis the firſt, the advance-guard of the Spaniſh army was attacked by M. de Lautrec, at the head of ſix ſquadrons of French horſe, ſupported by 100 men on foot: the Spaniards drove the French back with great ſlaughter, nor could Lautrec remedy the diſorder; he therefore begged of M. de Montluc, one of the beſt ſoldiers of thoſe days, to check, if he poſſibly could, the purſuit of the Spaniſh horſe, with the hundred foot he had under his command; this he, no ways diſmayed at the diſparity of numbers, promiſed to effect; and did it in the following manner, as related by himſelf. "I told the Captains of the horſe, to ſave the troops with all ſpeed, and turning round to my ſoldiers, ſaid, you ſee the cavalry are loſt if we do not exert ourſelves, ſo come along fellow-ſoldiers, and let us ſtop the Spaniards. Upon which I was followed by a hundred men of my company; twenty of thoſe, I diſpoſed as a reſerve under the command of a brave young

young ſoldier named De Auzan: we marched forward to the enemy, and paſt a rivulet in our front.

It muſt be remarked, the ſoldiers I commanded were but croſs-bows; I ordered De Auzan never to permit his men to ſhoot, but only to preſent and recover; by this means, I had always ſhot in reſerve. By this time I got to the place of combat, and obſerved all the enemy's cavalry, in one body, juſt going to charge ours; upon which, not being above twelve paces from the enemy, I ordered my men to give them a ſalvo of ſhot, calling out, take aim at the horſes heads. We thus killed and wounded above fifty, and ſo effectually ſtopt their charge, that before they could compleat their files, our cavalry had time to retire over the brook I had juſt paſt. I then began, ſeeing the cavalry out of danger, to think of my retreat. I gave them another volley, and ordered my men to ſcramble over a ditch that was within a few paces of me; this I accompliſhed under favour of De Auzan's ſhot, loſing only three men. Here I was in ſafety, as the cavalry could not paſs the ditch. Obſerving three companies of infantry, in rapid march along the plain, to join their cavalry, I retired under cover of the hedges, and ditches, until I repaſt the brook, and aſcended a riſing ground. During this retreat, I kept my handful of men, at cloſe files, ſpeaking to them often to keep up their courage, and making them frequently face to the right about, and give our purſuers a volley. I had now got to the high ground, it was covered with vineyards, by means of which I endeavoured to gain the bridge over which I muſt paſs; the road to it was covered with the enemy's cavalry,

many

many of whom I killed from the vineyards. Near to this bridge there was a church; I poſted a part of my men in the church-yard, thinking ſtill to make head, but this was an abſurd idea, for while I thus ſtopt, the enemy got to the bridge: I concluded then I was without hope, and muſt be cut off. I now gave the ſignal to collect my men, which having done, I marched ſtraight to the river, keeping ſome hedges between me and the enemy, who I was frequently obliged to make head againſt by a vigorous effort, drove them back, threw myſelf into the river with my men, and gained the other ſide without loſs. When I came to the end of the bridge, I found one of our Captains doing his utmoſt to deſtroy it. When he perceived me, he begged I would mount behind him, and ſave myſelf, but I made this anſwer, As God had preſerved me and the ſoldiers under my command, I never would quit them until I had brought them to a place of ſafety. This Captain then began his retreat. I croſſed a ditch that bordered a meadow; from thence, I got upon broken ground, where the cavalry could not charge me; having thus marched about half a league, I halted, as I obſerved the enemy had done the ſame. My men being much fatigued, I ordered them to eat ſomething; meanwhile arrived ſome horſemen ſent by Lautrec, to ſee what was become of me, for when he conſidered the number of the enemy I was obliged to retreat before, he concluded I was either killed or taken." This retreat was ſo much admired, that Montluc gained great fame, and was advanced directly to the command of a troop of men at arms.

WHEN

WHEN the Emperor invaded Provence, he encamped near Aix; Francis had his army at Avignon, and was given to underſtand, that if he could get the mills deſtroyed, that ſupplied the Emperor's army, he would be obliged to retire from France. The mill of Auriole was that from which the Emperor drew moſt of his ſubſiſtence; the King therefore determined, coſt what it would, to have it deſtroyed. The conducting of this enterprize was offered to many men of valour and experience in the French army; who all declared the execution impoſſible, ſeeing the mill was fifteen miles diſtant from them, cloſe to the Imperial army, and well guarded. At laſt Montluc undertook the enterprize, and thus conducted it, as he himſelf relates.

When I heard of the King's ardent deſire to have this mill deſtroyed, I determined to accompliſh it, or periſh in the attempt. I endeavoured to gain all the information I could reſpecting the ſituation of theſe mills; fortunately I found my landlord was a man of that place; he told me, Auriole was a ſmall town, ſurrounded with high walls, likewiſe a caſtle well fortified; in the midſt of the town a long ſtreet, at the end of which was the mill, ſituated upon the left hand as you entered the town; at the gate was a tower which enfiladed the great ſtreet that led to the mill, beyond which ſtood a ſmall church. He told me likewiſe, that the road went by Ambaigne, ſix miles from Marſeilles; and that it

was

was nine miles more to the mills, in all fifteen: but if I went by the horſe road, it was three miles more. After my landlord had given me the above information, I conſidered, that if I endeavoured to execute this enterprize with a large body of troops, I ſhould be defeated; for as the Emperor's camp was near, he would be immediately informed of the attack, and ſend troops to cut off my retreat, as indeed it happened. Thus for many reaſons I thought it better to take but few men, at the ſame time chooſing thoſe who were of approved courage and activity. I then made my landlord bring me three guides I could depend upon. I gave each of them two crowns, to encourage them, and kept them in my houſe, until I ſhould ſet out. Having conſulted with my guides, they informed me, that provided I began my march at night-fall, I ſhould have as much time as was neceſſary. I choſe one hundred and twenty men of the company, in which I ſerved as Lieutenant; and was followed by twenty horſe commanded by a friend of my own. When I had got ſome miles from the town, I divided my infantry into two bodies of ſixty men each, placing a guide at the head of each: the third guide, I ſent with the cavalry, who were led by M. Caſtellpers; the ſecond body of infantry was commanded by M. Belſoleil, who had orders to march one hundred yards behind my diviſion. After ſome hours of march, the guide informed me, we were within one mile of Auriole: upon which I ordered a halt, to give the ultimate orders for the attack. I ordered Captain Belſoleil to occupy the two houſes at the gate of the town, to prevent the enemy from ſallying upon me, while I was burning the mill. The cavalry had orders to poſt themſelves behind the

the church already mentioned. We then moved on, and as we were obliged to paſs cloſe by the walls of the town, their centinels challenged twice, we gave no anſwer, but continued our march, Captain Balſoleil to the gate, and I to the mill; which, when I approached within the length of a pike, a centry challenged, and immediately fired, but did no harm. I then ruſhed forward to the door of the mill, followed cloſe by my ſoldiers and ſome volunteers; from the ſituation of the door, only one at a time could enter. A volunteer went in firſt, and was ſoon followed by the others; the ſurprize was ſo compleat, that we found moſt of the enemy aſleep, who were all killed except a few that flung themſelves out of a window into the water. The defence of the mill had been committed to a captain and ſeventy men. The men were thus deſtroyed, and the captain wounded and taken priſoner. I then detached moſt of my men to aſſiſt Belſoleil, and hinder the enemy from making a ſortie, while I was burning the mill; this I accompliſhed in a ſhort period, and even carried off the iron work, that they might not have it in their power to repair the mill. The day now began to break. I aſſembled the whole detachment, and took the road to Marſeilles, having in this affair only eight men wounded. I made the men march ſo briſkly, that the enemy could not overtake us, and as they had proviſion, by my orders, with them, they eat it while marching. As it was natural to ſuppoſe the enemy would cut off my retreat, if I retired by the road I came, I turned to the left hand over the mountains. It was well I did ſo, for ſome of my wounded men, who went by the

great

great road, were taken priſoners by five hundred horſe detached to intercept me. Thus I brought back the detachment in ſafety to Marſeilles. No warlike action has ever been more applauded by men of ſervice than this of Montluc's; if we conſider the means, by which it was effected, and the conſequences reſulting from it; for it appears that a lieutenant, at the head of a ſmall detachment, obliged the Emperor to retire from the invaſion of France.

FINIS.